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HACKS, LEAKS, AND DATA DUMPS: THE RIGHT TO 
PUBLISH ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED INFORMATION 
TWENTY YEARS AFTER BARTNICKI V. VOPPER 
Erik Ugland* & Christina Mazzeo** 
Abstract: This Article addresses a fluid and increasingly salient category of cases involving 
the First Amendment right to publish information that was hacked, stolen, or illegally leaked 
by someone else. Twenty years ago, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court appeared to 
give broad constitutional cover to journalists and other publishers in these situations, but 
Justice Stevens’s inexact opinion for the Court and Justice Breyer’s muddling concurrence left 
the boundaries unclear. The Bartnicki framework is now implicated in dozens of new cases—
from the extradition and prosecution of Julian Assange, to Donald Trump’s threatened suit of 
The New York Times over his tax records, to the civil suits spawned by the hack of DNC 
servers—so there is a pressing need for clarity. 
The empirical part of this Article presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of every 
case applying Bartnicki over the past two decades to determine if lower courts have answered 
the questions Bartnicki left open and to identify points of confluence and conflict. The analysis 
shows courts are divided about nearly every aspect of Bartnicki. There is a circuit split 
regarding the amount of separation a publisher must have from a source in order to be 
protected, division about the relevance of statutory prohibitions on receiving or possessing 
certain information, and confusion about how to assess whether publications, particularly those 
involving large caches of data, address matters of public concern. 
The normative part of this Article proposes a reorientation of courts’ approaches to these 
issues by (1) untethering liability for the procurement, receipt, and publication of information, 
treating each as a legally discrete act; (2) denying Bartnicki protection only to those who 
directly participate or assist in the illegal procurement of information; (3) treating as a First 
Amendment violation any law punishing those who merely receive or possess newsworthy 
information; and (4) engaging in more contextual analyses of “public concern.” All of these 
changes will help stabilize the law, strike a better balance between newsgathering and secrecy, 
and vitalize press and citizen communication at a time of decreasing government and 
private-sector transparency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment is still not ready for Julian Assange. Eleven years 
after publishing a trove of classified diplomatic cables obtained through 
an illegal leak,1 the WikiLeaks founder,2 hacker,3 self-described 
 
1. In 2010, Assange obtained and published on WikiLeaks thousands of classified diplomatic 
cables and war logs that were leaked to him by U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Chelsea (then Bradley) 
Manning. Those materials contradicted official military accounts of U.S. operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The most notable was the so-called “Collateral Murder” video showing a 2007 U.S. 
airstrike in Iraq that killed at least a dozen civilians, including two Reuters journalists. See Elisabeth 
Bumiller, Video Shows U.S. Killing of Reuters Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html [https://perma.cc/MBZ8-
PNZQ]; Collateral Murder, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 5, 2010), https://collateralmurder.wikileaks.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7WM-KNDS]. 
2. Assange, an Australian citizen, is the principal founder of WikiLeaks, which was launched in 
2006 to provide a vehicle for disseminating information from leakers and whistleblowers while also 
producing original reporting. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER (May 31, 2010), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/06/07/no-secrets [https://perma.cc/GJS6-HAU6]. 
Assange served as its editor-in-chief from 2006 until September 26, 2018, when WikiLeaks 
announced that Kristinn Hrafnsson would take over as editor, but that Assange would remain as 




visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
3. Assange was an active hacker for much of his youth and into adulthood. When he was twenty, 
he pleaded guilty to twenty-five counts of computer fraud but was ultimately given a light sentence. 
Khatchadourian, supra note 2. 
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journalist,4 and ruthless transparency advocate5 remains in a British jail 
awaiting possible extradition to the United States to face an 
eighteen-charge indictment over his alleged role in soliciting, receiving 
and publishing secret information affecting national defense.6 Even if 
Assange is extradited,7 the outcome of his trial would be impossible to 
predict, because much of the relevant law remains inchoate. Nearly ninety 
years after the United States Supreme Court first struck down a 
government action limiting press freedom,8 U.S. courts have not fully 
answered some foundational questions about the boundaries of the First 
Amendment’s Press Clause9 and the institutions, individuals, and 
activities to which it should be applied. They are also years behind in 
grappling with emergent technology and the atomized ways in which 
news and information are now gathered and shared. 
An Assange prosecution could serve as a crucible for all of this, but 
that case is not singularly important; it is one of dozens that pose the same 
 
4. Scott Shane & Steven Erlanger, Assange: A Self-Proclaimed Foe of Secrecy Who Inspires Both 
Admiration and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/us/politic
s/wikileaks-assange.html [https://perma.cc/M3D2-R5K7] (“[Assange] has always described himself 
as a journalist . . . .”). 
5. See, e.g., Raffi Khatchadourian, Julian Assange, A Man Without a Country, NEW YORKER (Aug. 
14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/julian-assange-a-man-without-a-
country [https://perma.cc/33RF-TW7P] (“‘If it’s true information, we don’t care where it comes 
from,’ [Assange] said. ‘Let people fight with the truth, and when the bodies are cleared there will be 
bullets of truth everywhere.’”). 
6. Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2019) 
[hereinafter Assange Superseding Indictment]. A second superseding indictment was issued in June 
2020. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (E.D. Va. June 24, 
2020) [hereinafter Assange Second Superseding Indictment]. It adds additional information and 
broadens the scope of the inquiry but does not add any additional charges. Id. References in this 
Article to the “Assange indictment” refer to the first superseding indictment unless otherwise 
specified. Assange is in jail for violating his bail conditions following his arrest for allegedly sexually 
assaulting two women in Sweden. Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case, BBC 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11949341 [https://perma.cc/6VJU-
6UDK]. Those charges have been dropped but he remains in jail while a British court considers the 
U.S. Justice Department’s request to extradite Assange to the United States. Id.  
7. On Jan. 4, 2021, a British judge ruled that Assange could not be extradited because of his 
unstable mental state and the likeilhood that he would be held in isolation in a United States prison. 
Ben Quinn, Julian Assange Cannot Be Extradited to US, British Judge Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
4, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/04/julian-assange-cannot-be-extradited-to-
us-british-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/53DJ-QZJJ]. United States prosecutors are appealing that 
ruling. Id. Importantly, in her ruling, Judge Vanessa Baraitser did not reject the merits of the United 
States indictment, conceding that Assange could be prosecuted without violating his rights if United 
States prosecutors proved their case at trial. Id. 
8. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931) (striking down, under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a state law allowing judges to enjoin “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” 
publications). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the 
press . . . .”). 
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vital question: Can people be held civilly or criminally liable for 
publishing information that was illegally acquired by someone else? The 
United States Supreme Court has already addressed this question in two 
of its most important First Amendment cases, New York Times Co. v. 
United States (Pentagon Papers)10 and Bartnicki v. Vopper.11 But neither 
of those cases, nor the two together, provides a complete answer. Because 
Pentagon Papers involved an injunction halting publication, which is 
exceedingly rare, it is distinguishable from Assange’s case and most 
others like it. Bartnicki is more on point. It addressed the broadcast of an 
illegally intercepted and recorded phone conversation between people 
involved in a labor dispute between a school district and teacher’s union. 
The Court upheld the right of a radio host who obtained the recording to 
broadcast it, and concluded that people may disseminate illegally acquired 
information provided (1) they played no part in the illegal interception; 
(2) they lawfully acquired the information; and (3) the information relates 
to a matter of public concern.12 
The Bartnicki ruling was a leap forward but it left unanswered 
questions: When do journalists become so closely involved with their 
sources that they forfeit Bartnicki protection? In what circumstances do 
journalists obtain information unlawfully? What constitutes a matter of 
“public concern”? Finally, who is a journalist, or more precisely, what 
types of defendants are eligible for First Amendment protections in these 
situations? Despite these uncertainties, journalists and commentators 
often overstate the clarity and scope of Bartnicki when discussing it in the 
context of new hacking and leaking cases, presenting it as essentially a 
grant of absolute immunity for journalists and publishers who use illegally 
acquired information.13 Those accounts typically overlook the “public 
concern” prong of the Court’s test, which limits Bartnicki’s relevance in 
cases like Bollea v. Gawker14 involving the publication of a celebrity sex 
tape.15 They also tend to focus on Justice Stevens’s opinion of the Court 
 
10. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
11. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
12. Id. at 525. The Court did not explicitly present this as a test, but these were the conditions it 
highlighted as justification for its ruling for the defendants. Id.  
13. See discussion infra section II.C. 
14. 170 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
15. Id.; see also Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447 CI-01, 2016 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 4710 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016). Terry Bollea, a professional wrestler known by the name Hulk Hogan, 
sued Gawker media for invasion of privacy after Gawker published a link to an explicit video of 
Bollea engaged in a sexual encounter. Bollea, 170 So. 3d at 127. The video was recorded without 
Bollea’s knowledge or consent. Id. After rejecting Gawker’s claim that the video was newsworthy 
because Bollea is both a celebrity and someone who has publicly discussed his past sexual 
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in Bartnicki without recognizing the ways in which it was both narrowed 
and obfuscated by the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer.16 These 
inexact media reports mask the fact that Bartnicki is not the robust, 
anchoring precedent that people assume but a cautious, narrow and 
ambiguous first step, and a precedent whose persuasiveness and durability 
are even more uncertain in light of new technologies and changes in the 
makeup of the Court. 
Resolving these issues is especially urgent in light of broader social 
trends—authoritarian drift,17 declining government transparency,18 
withering press freedom19—but also because new cases and controversies 
are regularly arising that expose the post-Bartnicki instability: 
In a March 2017 tweet that he later deleted, New York Times columnist 
Nicholas Kristof urged employees of the IRS to leak President Donald 
Trump’s tax returns to him.20 Would Kristof be protected by Bartnicki 
against a felony charge of soliciting a crime, or would his actions be 
treated as “participation” under prong one of the Bartnicki test? 
In January 2019, the National Enquirer began publishing private text 
messages sent by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos to his mistress, Lauren 
 
experiences, the court awarded Bollea $115 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in 
punitive damages. Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill in Hulk Hogan Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-
damages-25-million-gawker-case.html#:~:text=A%20Florida%20jury%20assessed%20 
Gawker,in%20compensatory%20damages%20last%20week [https://perma.cc/LE86-6L38]. Gawker 
and its founder, Nick Denton, subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lukas I. Alpert, Gawker Files for 
Bankruptcy, Will Be Put Up for Auction, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gawker-declaring-bankruptcy-will-be-put-up-for-auction-1465578030 
[https://perma.cc/9QD5-RQM9]. 
16. See discussion infra section II.B. 
17. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); Gideon 
Rose, Autocracy Now, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 8. 
18. See generally U.S. Hits New Low in Global Corruption Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 23, 
2020), https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2019-cpi-us-hits-new-low [https://perma.cc/PM77-
RBM3] (citing Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2019), 
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019 [https://perma.cc/9HSF-HZWV]); Micah Lee, The 
Metadata Trap, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 4, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/08/04/whis
tleblowers-surveillance-fbi-trump/ [https://perma.cc/7HGY-3XZ5] (describing Trump 
Administration use of data surveillance to track and prosecute government leakers). 
19. See generally Global Expression Report 2018-19: Global Freedom of Expression at a Ten-Year 
Low, ARTICLE19 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/global-expression-report-2018-
19-global-freedom-of-expression-at-a-ten-year-low/ [https://perma.cc/SX7G-ED32]. 




employees-to-unlawfully-leak-trumps-tax-returns (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“But if you’re in IRS 
and have a certain president’s tax return that you’d like to leak, my address is: NYT, 620 Eighth Ave, 
NY NY 10018.”).  
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Sanchez, which the Enquirer obtained by paying $200,000 to Sanchez’s 
brother.21 Is the Enquirer covered by Bartnicki, or did the payment make 
this an “unlawful acquisition” under prong two? 
In July 2015, ESPN reporter Adam Schefter tweeted a leaked image of 
NFL player Jason Pierre-Paul’s private medical record indicating that 
Pierre-Paul’s finger had been amputated following a fireworks accident.22 
Does Bartnicki shield ESPN and Schefter, or does this material lie outside 
of the “public concern” condition of prong three? 
Similar cases are emerging in other jurisdictions and in cases involving 
citizen-journalists, activists, and ordinary social media users who want to 
share newsworthy information that was illegally acquired or leaked by 
someone else.23 These cases highlight enduring uncertainties about 
journalistic identity and its constitutional significance, something that is 
also implicated by the case against Assange, whom prosecutors have 
taken pains to present as a hacker and saboteur, not a journalist.24 
Another question that has emerged since Bartnicki is whether 
publishers lose First Amendment protection if they fail to exercise 
 
21. Michael Rothfeld, Joe Palazzolo & Alexandra Berzon, How the National Enquirer Got Bezos’ 
Texts: It Paid $200,000 to His Lover’s Brother, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2019, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-national-enquirer-got-bezos-texts-it-paid-200-000-to-his-
lovers-brother-11552953981 [https://perma.cc/KH3N-ENGA]. 
22. Adam Schefter (@AdamSchefter), TWITTER (July 8, 2015, 4:04 p.m.), 
https://twitter.com/AdamSchefter/status/618918579770146816 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“ESPN 
obtained medical charts that show Giants DE Jason Pierre-Paul had right index finger 
amputated today.”).  
23. In July 2019, the Daily Mail in London published leaked diplomatic cables from Britain’s 
ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, in which Darroch privately lambasted President 
Trump. British police warned journalists that publishing the cables “may also be a criminal matter.” 
Henry Martin, Terror Cops Probe Leak of Darroch Emails About Trump: Scotland Yard Is Accused 
of ‘Police State’ Tactics with Threat to Prosecute Publishers Who Print More Secrets, DAILY MAIL 
(July 13, 2019, 4:34 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7242257/UK-police-launch-
investigation-leak-ambassador-Sir-Kim-Darrochs-diplomatic-emails.html [https://perma.cc/8QZ5-
NPLU]. That same month, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro threatened criminal charges against 
Brazil-based Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald after he published material hacked from a cellphone 
conversation between a judge and prosecutors. Brazilians Show Support for American Journalist 
Greenwald, AP NEWS (July 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/cd8c55f4a9ec49cc83724cda81d32
be7 [https://perma.cc/E5MG-9E8C]. The criminal charges were later dropped by the government is 
appealing that ruling. Brazilian Prosecutors Appeal Judge’s Order, Refuse to Drop Criminal Charges 
Against Journalist Glenn Greenwald, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUND. (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://freedom.press/news/brazilian-prosecutors-appeal-judges-order-refuse-to-drop-criminal-
charges-against-journalist-glenn-greenwald/ [https://perma.cc/W2W5-7WMA]. 
24. See Press Release, Dept. of Just., Remarks from the Briefing Announcing the Superseding 
Indictment of Julian Assange (May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1165636/download [https://perma.cc/2MYD-KP9H] (“Julian Assange is no journalist. 
This made plain by the totality of his conduct as alleged in the indictment—i.e., his conspiring with 
and assisting a security clearance holder to acquire classified information, and his publishing the 
names of human sources.”). 
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editorial scrutiny over the information they disclose. Do “data dumpers” 
who indiscriminately post leaked files online qualify for protection? The 
dissenters in Bartnicki anticipated this problem and argued that the 
majority’s approach would allow people to “anonymously launder” 
illegally acquired records by simply handing them off to third parties.25 
This is essentially what happened in 2016 when WikiLeaks published 
thousands of private emails that were hacked from Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) staff members and from Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
chair, John Podesta, apparently by Russian operatives. The DNC hack has 
already spawned two civil cases, yielding diametric rulings from two 
federal district courts.26 These cases also highlight the editorial scrutiny 
question because WikiLeaks likely did not review each of the more than 
70,000 email messages and attachments that it published.27 
This Article provides a comprehensive review of all lower court cases 
applying Bartnicki to understand how the case has been interpreted over 
the past twenty years and how lower courts have answered the questions 
left open by the Supreme Court in 2001. The Article also critically 
evaluates the courts’ analyses and offers normative suggestions for 
unifying this area of law, both through a reversal and reimagining of 
Bartnicki and, alternatively, through a set of interpretive adjustments to 
each prong of the Bartnicki test. 
Part I traces the evolution of the right to gather news and describes the 
Supreme Court’s mixed guidance on these issues, both with regard to the 
general right to seek information and with regard to the scope of 
protections in situations like Bartnicki where newsgathering and 
expression are closely intertwined. 
Part II summarizes the review of cases applying Bartnicki, showing 
significant divisions among the courts over the meaning and scope of each 
prong of the Bartnicki test, including splits between several circuit courts. 
 
25. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 551 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
26. In one case, Democratic National Committee (DNC) donors and staffers sued the Trump 
Campaign for allegedly collaborating with Russian hackers who accessed the plaintiffs’ private email 
communications, which were later published by WikiLeaks. That claim was dismissed by a federal 
district court in March 2019 after the court found no evidence of collaboration between the defendants 
and the suspected hackers. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. 
Va. 2019). In the second case, decided July 30, 2019, a federal district court dismissed a DNC lawsuit 
against Assange and WikiLeaks (among other defendants) for its role in publishing the hacked emails 
because the defendants did not actually participate in the hack. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. 
Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
27. WikiLeaks published 20,000 DNC emails just four days after receiving them from the Russian 
hackers. 1 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 46 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUQ3-276H]. The organization later 
published, over the course of a month, 50,000 of Podesta’s e-mails and related documents. Id. at 48. 
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With regard to prong one, courts disagree about the amount of 
involvement a publisher must have with a source before becoming a 
“participant” in an illegal acquisition of information. Some courts have 
drawn support from Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion to deny 
Bartnicki protection to those who knew the information they received was 
illegally acquired and to those who encouraged illegal leaks. On prong 
two, at least one circuit court has held that reporters lose Bartnicki 
protection when requesting certain non-public records—even when those 
records are newsworthy and are supplied by the government—creating an 
extraordinary loophole to the Bartnicki framework. As for prong three, 
courts continue to disagree about both the definition of “public concern” 
and about whether to assess it—particularly in hacking and data-dump 
cases—by examining individual revelations or the impact of the totality 
of the disclosures. 
Part III outlines proposals for reorienting the law by, at the broadest 
level, completely severing the connection between the right to publish 
information and the legality of its procurement. More specifically, it 
suggests applying a modified aiding and abetting standard under prong 
one, denying Bartnicki protection only to those who are actively involved 
in the illegal procurement of information. With regard to prong two, it 
proposes the elimination of any liability for those who merely receive or 
possess illegally acquired but newsworthy information. It also endorses a 
contextually driven concept of public concern that considers the 
newsworthiness of the totality of what is published for determining the 
applicability of Bartnicki while still holding publishers accountable for 
harms caused by the content of what they publish. 
I. THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 
This Article focuses on a small but increasingly vital category of First 
Amendment cases involving the intersection of free expression rights and 
rights to gather news and information. In these cases, the government or 
a civil litigant seeks to suppress or subsequently punish the dissemination 
of information, at least in part because of some alleged problem with the 
means by which it was acquired. The Supreme Court did not begin to 
address this confluence of newsgathering and expression until the 1970s. 
In fact, the Court did not even begin to develop its free press jurisprudence 
until 1931 in Near v. Minnesota28—the first case in which the Court struck 
down a government restriction on speech in a traditional mass medium.29 
 
28. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
29. Id. at 722–23. The Court had decided a handful of free speech cases prior to Near, but all of 
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Throughout the next several decades, most of the Court’s First 
Amendment decisions involved obscenity, defamation, or other cases 
focused on harms associated with the speech itself. In many of these cases, 
the Court made reference to the press or to media defendants but never 
clarified whether the Speech Clause30 and Press Clause31 should be treated 
as discrete sources of protection or as a collective statement about free 
expression, and it never explained whether and to what extent the First 
Amendment protects pre-publication activities. Four decades after Near, 
the Court started to confront these questions, but despite tectonic shifts in 
communications practices over the past twenty years, the rise of 
citizen-journalists and the proliferation of new surveillance tools and 
distributions platforms, the Court has not offered any significant insights 
on these issues since Bartnicki in 2001. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Conceptualization of the Right to 
Gather News 
The Supreme Court has only addressed the right to gather news32 in a 
handful of cases. The first was Branzburg v. Hayes,33 in which the Court 
acknowledged that newsgathering “is not without its First Amendment 
protections”34 and that “without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”35 Despite those affirmations, 
Branzburg was a step backward in that the Court refused to recognize a 
First Amendment-based reporter’s privilege—the right of journalists to 
quash subpoenas seeking their work products or testimony, particularly 
where confidential sources might be exposed. The Court in Branzburg 
was deeply divided, however, and because the fifth vote was supplied by 
 
them involved speakers and pamphleteers. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
(involving the distribution of leaflets opposing the military draft); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919) (involving the distribution of leaflets opposing the United States’ involvement in World 
War I); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (involving the distribution of a printed manifesto 
urging worker strikes and revolts to help institute a socialist government). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
31. Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . .”). 
32. It is important to distinguish the right to gather information from the right to receive 
information. The Court has recognized the latter right in several cases, but none of these involved the 
pursuit of new information; they involved government attempts to interrupt the flow of information 
from one party to another. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding right of 
citizen to receive and possess obscene material in his home); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301 (1965) (striking down law blocking mail distribution of communist literature). 
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
34. Id. at 707. 
35. Id. at 681. 
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Justice Powell, who urged a case-by-case approach,36 the decision left the 
door open for lower courts to recognize some protections in contexts 
dissimilar from those in Branzburg.37 This is precisely what happened in 
the subsequent decades. Most of the federal circuit courts now recognize 
some form of the reporter’s privilege,38 and forty state legislatures have 
passed shield laws providing reporters with statutory protections against 
certain subpoenas,39 although Congress has still not passed a federal 
shield law. 
In the years following Branzburg, the Supreme Court continued to 
emphasize the absence of constitutional protections for newsgathering. In 
a series of cases in the 1970s, the Court rejected journalists’ claims of a 
First Amendment right of access to prisons and prisoners.40 In 1978, the 
Court refused to recognize a First Amendment shield against newsroom 
searches,41 and the following year it held that journalists and news 
organizations are not immune from inquiries into their editorial 
decision-making processes by libel litigants.42 More than a decade later, 
the Court reiterated in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.43 that journalists and 
the press have no First Amendment defense against the application of 
generally applicable laws.44 The Court ruled in Cohen that journalists 
could be sued for breaking their promises of confidentiality with 
sources.45 The Court has also repeatedly rejected attempts by journalists 
to gain access to places where the public generally is not permitted.46 
 
36. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
37. Branzburg and the associated cases decided concurrently—In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 
and United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)—involved grand jury subpoenas seeking 
confidential source information.   
38. See Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/H7LP-EP5H]. 
39. Id. 
40. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding California regulations effectively preventing 
journalists from interviewing prisoners); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding 
federal regulations denying press access to prisoners); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) 
(denying right of broadcast journalists to observe and record conditions in county jail). 
41. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (upholding constitutional validity of police 
execution of a search warrant on the premises of a university newspaper). In response to Zurcher, the 
U.S. Congress provided a statutory fix by passing a law explicitly prohibiting searches of newsrooms 
except under certain conditions. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.  
42. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
43. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
44. Id. at 669 (“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because 
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”). 
45. Id. at 671–72. 
46. See Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, supra note 38. Lower courts have followed suit. See, 
e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 355 F.3d 697 
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Although the Court has recognized a First Amendment-based right of 
access to attend some judicial proceedings and to access associated 
judicial records,47 it has made clear that those rights belong to the “public 
and press”48 and are less about enabling news coverage than honoring 
traditions and ensuring fair processes. Despite acknowledging in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia49 that “it is difficult for [citizens] 
to accept what they are prohibited from observing,”50 the Court has 
explicitly rejected the notion that the First Amendment compels the 
government to provide access to government-controlled records51 
or places.52 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the right to 
capture images, video, or data in public places, several federal courts have 
begun to recognize a right to record police officers53 or other government 
officials54 while they are on duty. Some courts have framed this as part of 
a broader right to photograph and record “matters of public interest”55—
sometimes even on private property56—and have emphasized the 
 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting First Amendment right of journalists to accompany troops during military 
operations); City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. 1989) (finding no First Amendment 
problem with disorderly conduct charge against reporter who refused to leave scene of a plane crash). 
47. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of 
Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
48. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558. 
49. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
50. Id. at 572. 
51. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013). 
52. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The Constitution does not . . . require 
government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public 
generally.”); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (“Whether government should open 
penal institutions . . . is a question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately 
resolve . . . .”). Congress and all fifty state legislatures have substantially filled that void, however, 
by passing freedom of information laws that establish at least a presumption of access to most 
government records and meetings. See Open Government Guide, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/ [https://perma.cc/DY9Y-8T9H]. 
53. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (issuing a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of Illinois eavesdropping law making it a felony to record audio of 
police officers); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting police officers’ claim of 
qualified immunity because their arrest of citizen who recorded them in public was a violation of the 
citizen’s clearly established First Amendment rights); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (reversing a lower court’s summary judgment dismissal of an assault claim against police 
officers who allegedly sought to intimidate citizen who had been recording protesters). 
54. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing “the right to 
gather information about what public officials do on public property”). 
55. Id. 
56. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (striking down state 
“Ag-Gag” law limiting ability of activists and journalists to document animal abuse on large farms 
and ranches). 
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indivisibility of newsgathering and news dissemination.57 This domain of 
cases is still evolving but shows that lower courts are at least starting to 
give shape to the Supreme Court’s vague recognition in Branzburg of a 
right to gather news, even though the Court itself has done little 
to elaborate. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Newsgathering-Expression 
Interconnections 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have been clearer and more 
solicitous in cases where newsgathering is closely linked with expression. 
In Pentagon Papers, the fact that the key information was supplied via an 
illegal leak was not enough to stop the Court from striking down an order 
prohibiting publication.58 And lower courts have held that even though 
journalists are not immune from liability for laws they break59 or torts they 
commit60 while gathering news, those claims must be disentangled from 
claims targeting what they publish or broadcast.61 
The Supreme Court’s most thorough statements on the intersection of 
newsgathering and dissemination have come in a line of cases involving 
attempts to suppress or punish the publication of information that was not 
meant to be public. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,62 the Court 
vacated the criminal prosecution of reporters who violated a state law by 
publishing the name of a juvenile crime suspect. In doing so, the Court 
established a formidable standard: when someone “lawfully obtains 
truthful information about a matter of public significance,” the state may 
not punish its publication “absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.”63 The Court did not elaborate about what might constitute 
unlawful acquisition, nor whether this fact is always dispositive. 
In the other cases in this line, however, the Court found criminal or 
civil penalties to be unconstitutional when targeting the publication of 
 
57. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595; see also Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (“[C]laim[ing] that the act of 
creating an audiovisual recording is not speech protected by the First Amendment . . . is akin to saying 
that even though a book is protected by the First Amendment, the process of writing the book is not.”). 
58. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment 
defense of journalist who downloaded child pornography, ostensibly as research for a story on 
the subject). 
60. Food Lion, Inc. v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
61. Id. (affirming judgment against defendant news organization for tort violations—trespass, 
breach of the duty of loyalty—committed by employees as part of an undercover investigation but 
reversing the awarding of publication-related damages); see infra text accompanying notes 277–280. 
62. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
63. Id. at 103. 
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private information that: was disclosed in open court (Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn64), was revealed in a proceeding closed to the public but 
open to journalists (Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court65), was the 
subject of a closed proceeding but was independently discovered by 
journalists (Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia66), or was 
provided to journalists by mistake (Florida Star v. B.J.F.67). 
This was the general state of the law leading up to the Court’s decision 
in Bartnicki in 2001. The Court had acknowledged, as a sort of abstract 
principle, that the First Amendment implicitly protects a right to gather 
news, but the Court had repeatedly rejected the pleas of journalists to 
provide specific layers of privileges not enjoyed by the public generally. 
Where the Court had been solicitous of press litigants, however, was in 
cases in which expressive rights were more tightly intertwined with 
newsgathering—a situation presented again by the facts of Bartnicki. 
II. THE MEANING AND INFLUENCE OF BARTNICKI V. 
VOPPER 
Bartnicki reached the Supreme Court at the dawn of the Digital Age—
a period in which legislatures were still trying to protect internet users 
from salacious content68 while at the same time a generation of internet 
utopians were declaring cyberspace to be a wholly differentiated sphere 
of human existence beyond the reach of traditional law or national 
boundaries.69 The Court has always been reluctant to make wide-ranging 
pronouncements, especially where dynamic spheres of society are 
involved, and indeed the justices in Bartnicki expressed some hesitation 
about trying to map legal boundaries during a period of unusual 
technological tumult.70 Nevertheless, twenty years later, courts are still 
struggling to understand and apply Bartnicki and are now faced with a 
range of new speech-privacy conflicts and tech-enabled newsgathering 
 
64. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
65. 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
66. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
67. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
68. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 609; S. 652, 104th Cong. § 501, 110 
Stat. 133 (1996) (enacted). 
69. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/M2W9-
NH4W].  
70. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the 
Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to 
the individual’s interest in basic personal privacy. Clandestine and pervasive invasions of 
privacy . . . are genuine possibilities as a result of continuously advancing technologies.”). 
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and surveillance practices, so there is an urgent need to find clarity and 
for the Court to reengage with these issues. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bartnicki 
The Bartnicki case arose in the unremarkable context of a labor 
negotiation between a teacher’s union and a school board. When the head 
of the union, Gloria Bartnicki, and its chief negotiator, Anthony Kane, 
were on a private cell phone conversation discussing the matter, someone 
(whose identity was never discovered) intercepted and recorded their 
exchange. The conversation was mostly about strategy but included a 
sensational declaration by Kane that if the school board did not agree to a 
3% pay raise, “we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . . To blow 
off their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those 
guys.”71 The recording was given to a local political operative, Jack 
Yocum,72 who eventually gave it to Fredrick Vopper—a radio host who, 
on multiple occasions, put salient parts of the recording on the air. 
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum and Vopper for violating federal and 
state wiretap laws,73 which prohibit the intentional interception of private 
electronic communications. Those laws also criminalize the disclosure of 
the contents of illegal interceptions by anyone who knew, or had reason 
to know, that the material been illegally intercepted.74 
Four decades earlier, in Pentagon Papers, the Court made clear that the 
illegal actions of a source in acquiring and disclosing information are not 
automatically imputed to a journalist who receives that information.75 But 
the justices did not foreclose the possibility that in other contexts a 
source’s illegal actions could be relevant in deciding an action against a 
journalist. The justices also did not address the extent to which actions by 
the journalists themselves could undo their freedom to publish. The Court 
revisited these issues in Florida Star, posing but not reaching the 
following question: “[W]hether, in cases where information has been 
acquired unlawfully . . . government may ever punish not only the 
 
71. Id. at 518–19 (majority opinion). 
72. Yocum testified that someone had left a tape recording of the phone call in his mailbox. Id. 
at 519. 
73. Id. at 520 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); and then citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 5725(a) (2000)). 
74. The Court indicated that both Yocum and Vopper had reason to know the recording was 
illegally captured, even if they did not know the identity of the interceptor. Id. at 517–18, 525. 
75. As the Court in Bartnicki noted, none of the justices in Pentagon Papers placed any weight on 
the fact that the information the defendant intended to publish had been stolen by its source. Id. at 528. 
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unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”76 In Bartnicki, 
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, framed the question more narrowly: 
“Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the 
information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who 
has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing 
publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?”77 
The Court in Bartnicki held that the wiretap statutes’ prohibitions on 
capturing and using private communications were content-neutral, but it 
construed the “naked prohibition against disclosures . . . as a regulation of 
pure speech.”78 Such communications, the Court held, are subject to the 
more exacting standard outlined in Daily Mail barring punishment for 
publication “absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”79 
The Court concluded that neither the government’s interest in eliminating 
the incentive to intercept private communications80 nor the need to protect 
communicators’ privacy was sufficiently weighty to justify the burden on 
speech. The Court acknowledged that the privacy of communications is 
an especially important interest that is threatened by the possibility of 
public disclosure but noted that this must be balanced against the First 
Amendment interests implicated by punishing the dissemination of 
newsworthy information. The conversation between Kane and Bartnicki, 
the Court concluded, “unquestionably”81 involved matters of public 
concern82 and therefore “implicate[d] the core purposes of the 
First Amendment.”83 
The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, 
was principally directed to this last point. Breyer argued that the majority 
gave too little weight to the government’s interests in protecting 
communicative privacy—an interest that Breyer said is, like speech itself, 
one “of the highest order.”84 He framed the wiretap laws as simultaneously 
 
76. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Because the defendant in 
Florida Star had lawfully obtained the records at issue, the Court did not have a reason to address this 
question directly, so the Court reserved the question for future consideration. Id. 
77. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner I), 191 F.3d 463, 484–85 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)). 
78. Id. at 526 (emphasis added). 
79. Id. at 103; see also supra text accompanying notes 62–63. 
80. The Court was skeptical that punishing disclosures would actually inhibit illegal interceptions 
and noted that the plaintiffs had provided no evidence to justify that claim. In any case, the Court 
held, the more efficient way to create such a deterrence is to punish more strictly the act of illegal 
interception itself. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530–31. 
81. Id. at 535. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 533–34. 
84. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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speech-restricting and speech-enhancing and suggested that a more 
careful balancing of interests was therefore required.85 Breyer wrote that 
because the majority’s approach undervalued the plaintiffs’ interests in 
expressive privacy, it effectively applied a strict scrutiny analysis, which 
is “normally out of place where, as here, important competing 
constitutional interests are implicated.”86 In the end, however, Breyer 
agreed that the defendants should prevail but only because the plaintiffs’ 
“privacy expectations [were] unusually low,”87 and “the public interest in 
defeating those expectations [was] unusually high.”88 Breyer also noted at 
the end of his concurrence that he worried that the majority opinion might 
tie the hands of legislators who will struggle in future years to protect 
citizens’ privacy interests in a world of new and increasingly 
invasive technologies.89 
The dissenters echoed Breyer’s concerns about privacy. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, emphasized the 
“widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques”90 and 
argued that because the risk of intrusions into people’s private 
communications could actually chill speech, robust statutory protections 
were warranted.91 By limiting the enforcement of those types of 
protections, the majority, Rehnquist wrote, “diminishes, rather than 
enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment.”92 
B. Interpretions of Bartnicki 
What most people glean from the Court’s decision in Bartnicki is that 
journalists and others can publish illegally acquired information, provided 
(1) they played no part in the illegal interception; (2) they obtained access 
to the information lawfully; and (3) the information relates to a matter of 
 
85. Id. at 536 (asking whether the statutes “strike a reasonable balance between their 
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences . . . [o]r do they instead impose restrictions on 
speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and 
speech-related benefits”). 
86. Id. at 536–37.  
87. Id. at 540. Breyer noted that the plaintiffs were both “limited public figures” who “voluntarily 
engaged in a public controversy.” Id. at 539. 
88. Id. at 540. Breyer explained that there was no unlawful activity by the defendants and no 
coordination between them and the interceptor, id. at 538, and that the phone conversation involved 
a matter of “unusual public concern” because it included a threat of “physical harm to others,” id. 
at 536. 
89. Id. at 541. 
90. Id. at 542–43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67 (1968)). 
91. Id. at 543. 
92. Id. at 542. 
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public concern.93 This is a reasonable takeaway and a paraphrase of what 
Justice Stevens wrote in his opinion for the Court. But this unqualified 
phrasing of the Bartnicki test blunts the definitional difficulties that 
remain, the fact-dependency of the ruling, and its attenuated standing as 
precedent in light of the caveats and qualifications in Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice O’Connor. 
Justice Breyer did not specifically object to any of the three 
components of the test laid out by Stevens, but he presented a laundry list 
of conditions and possible exceptions, which will be referred to here as 
the “Breyer contingencies.” With regard to prong one, Breyer noted the 
fact that “the broadcasters here engaged in no unlawful activity”94 but 
added that the defendants “neither encouraged nor participated directly or 
indirectly in the interception”95 and no one “ordered, counseled, 
encouraged, or otherwise aided or abetted the interception, the later 
delivery of the tape by the interceptor to an intermediary, or the tape’s still 
later delivery by the intermediary to the media”96 implying that each of 
these could be material and distinguishing facts in other cases. With 
regard to prong two, Breyer pointed out that the federal and Pennsylvania 
wiretap laws did not make it illegal to receive illegally intercepted 
communications,97 something the majority acknowledged as well,98 
leaving open the possibility that such a proscription might have changed 
the analysis.99 And with regard to prong three, Breyer focused on the fact 
that Kane and Bartnicki were “limited public figures”100 and that the 
“front porches” comment by Kane was a bona fide threat of violence.101 
This is quite different than Stevens’s opinion for the Court, which treated 
the entire subject of the conversation as “unquestionably a matter of 
 
93. Id. at 525. 
94. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
95. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiori at 33a, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99–1687)). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 525 (majority opinion). 
99. The majority is clear, however, that mere knowledge or suspicion that that material was illegally 
acquired by someone else is not, by itself, enough to make receipt of the information unlawful. Id. at 
532 n.19. 
100. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer borrows this phrase from the context of defamation 
law. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining limited public figures 
as those who are perhaps not widely known or influential like traditional public figures but who 
nevertheless invite “attention and comment” because they “have thrust themselves to the forefront of 
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved”). 
101. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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public concern.”102 
Setting aside the complications presented by Breyer’s concurrence, 
Stevens’s opinion is indefinite in some respects. With regard to prong one, 
Stevens emphasized that reporters who disseminate information of public 
interest do not lose their protection because of a “stranger’s illegal 
conduct,”103 which suggests that a different result could occur in situations 
in which the parties know each other or are engaged in more active 
collaboration.104 Clearly, a reporter who personally engages in an illegal 
wiretap would lose protection,105 but beyond that, it is not clear where the 
line is to be drawn. With regard to prong two, it is still not certain what 
constitutes unlawful acquisition of information, nor whether this always 
and fully forecloses First Amendment protection.106 Finally, it is not clear 
what the Court means by “public concern.” The dissenters, Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, mocked the Court’s reliance on this 
“amorphous concept,” which they said Justice Stevens did “not even 
attempt to define.”107 Their concern was validated by Stevens’s and 
Breyer’s disparate conceptualizations of public concern108 and by the 
Court’s terminological inconsistency, using, without distinguishing: 
“public interest,”109 “public significance,”110 “public issue[],”111 “public 
 
102. Id. at 535 (majority opinion). Breyer tried to clarify that the Court “does not create a ‘public 
interest’ exception that swallows up the . . . rule” but rather “finds constitutional protection for 
publication of intercepted information of a special kind.” Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). This is 
correct insofar as it is clearly insufficient to simply claim the presence of an issue of public concern, 
but it is incorrect insofar as it suggests that Breyer and Stevens are aligned on the meaning of the term 
“public concern.” Stevens took a contextual and categorical approach while Breyer focused on the 
public safety threat and the public status of the participants. 
103. Id. at 535 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  
104. At several other points in the opinion, the Court uses the phrase “third party” rather than 
emphasizing “stranger.” Id. at 525, 528, 530. 
105. That is what occurred in Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), one of the 
cases that triggered the Court’s grant of certiorari in Bartnicki, and a case the Court distinguishes at 
the outset of its opinion. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522 & n.5. 
106. This is a question the Court posed in Pentagon Papers and Florida Star, which the Court has 
repeatedly reserved and which it did not fully answer in Bartnicki: “whether, in cases where 
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish 
not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.” Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524, 535 n.8 (1989) (emphasis in original). 
107. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 304–311. 
109. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
110. Id. at 527–28 (majority opinion) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 
103 (1979)). 
111. Id. at 518. 
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concern,”112 and “newsworthy.”113 The justices likely understood these to 
be synonymous (indeed, those terms are used interchangeably by other 
courts and by the authors of this Article), but the Court left unnecessary 
confusion by not saying so.114 
Bartnicki was clearly an important ruling in that it extended the right 
to publish illegally acquired information beyond the prior restraint context 
of Pentagon Papers, and Stevens’s opinion for the Court is a strong 
defense of the right to publish. But its force is limited by its own 
imprecision and by its dependency on the votes of Breyer and O’Connor, 
whose separate concurring opinion introduced a series of conditions that 
opened the door for less protective applications in the future. The only 
things that a majority of justices agreed about were that the right to publish 
illegally acquired information must be balanced against competing social 
interests (in Bartnicki, the protection of privacy) and that the more 
connected a publisher is to illegal activity, or the less connected the 
material is to public issues, the more the balance must tilt against the 
publisher. Much like with the Court’s divided ruling on the reporter’s 
privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes115—in which the decisive fifth vote was 
provided by a justice whose concurrence narrowed the reach of the 
majority opinion116—the full meaning and impact of Bartnicki has 
become a project for the lower courts. 
C. Emerging Cases and the Enduring Confusion About Bartnicki 
The initial reaction to Bartnicki by many journalists and lawyers was 
jubilant. The effect of the decision was to affirm the rights of journalists 
and extend the reach of Pentagon Papers, and because most people 
naturally focused on the immediate outcome and on Stevens’s opinion for 
the Court, speech and press supporters were thrilled.117 Legal scholars 
realized quickly, however, that the decision was replete with uncertainties 
and moderating conditions. A number of articles have explored these 
idiosyncrasies over the past two decades, both in assessments of the case 
 
112. Id. at 525. 
113. Id. 
114. The Court has offered at least some additional guidance on the meaning of these terms in 
subsequent cases. See supra text accompanying notes 304–311. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 33–37. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
117. See, e.g., William R. Self & Minabere Ibelema, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Landmark or Question 
Mark, 40 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 13, 13 (2002) (describing some of the excited responses to the ruling). 
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itself118 and in studies of related problems.119 
Despite these more careful analyses, however, Bartnicki is often 
mischaracterized or oversimplified in media analyses of contemporary 
controversies. After hackers breached the user data of Ashely Madison—
a dating service marketed to people in pre-existing relationships120—one 
analyst suggested that while the hackers clearly broke the law, the press 
“can basically run with any information given to them innocently, even if 
the person giving it to them obtained it illegally.”121 Likewise, when Terry 
Bollea (professional wrestler Hulk Hogan) sued Gawker magazine for 
publishing Boella’s illicitly-filmed sex tape, commentators made 
similarly sweeping claims. “[T]he law is on Gawker’s side,” a Reuters 
legal analyst noted, because the Supreme Court held in Bartnicki that “in 
matters of public importance, the First Amendment trumps privacy.”122 
These characterizations ignored Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which 
treated speech and privacy as comparably important rights,123 and they 
presupposed the legitimacy of the public interest in the sex tape. A more 
recent Wired analysis of the case against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks 
 
118. See, e.g., id. at 31 (characterizing Bartnicki as “fundamentally flawed and problematic”); see 
also Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a  Laboratory for First Amendment 
Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287 (2011) (using the Bartnicki ruling as a kind 
of heuristic for understanding the different frameworks courts might apply to the same constitutional 
problem); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment 
Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421 (2006) (rejecting the notion that Bartnicki is an example of the 
First Amendment being used to defeat legitimate consumer protection laws); Richard D. Shoop, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 449 (2002) (predicting Bartnicki will have less 
long-term impact because of the “ambiguity and fragility of the holding”). 
119. See, e.g., Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data 
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2017) (examining, in part, Bartnicki’s impact on business and personal 
privacy); William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for Newsgathering 
Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 129 (2009) (addressing Bartnicki’s limitations in shielding journalists 
from criminal liability for seeking classified material); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as 
Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 
(2002) (exploring Bartnicki’s possible application and misapplication in a variety of contexts in which 
publishers disseminate illegally acquired information). 
120. Ashley Madison is a website and dating app that matches people in relationships with others 
who are interested in having affairs. See ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com/en-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/C89D-P3GP]. Its assurances of anonymity are naturally an important selling point 
of the service. 
121. Kate Cox, Why the Stolen Ashley Madison Data Is (Legally) Fair Game for the Internet, 
CONSUMERIST (Aug. 25, 2015, 10:23 AM), https://consumerist.com/2015/08/25/why-the-stolen-
ashley-madison-data-is-legally-fair-game-for-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/4E67-EQH5]. 
122. Alison Frankel, Why Does Hulk Hogan Even Have a Case Against Gawker?, REUTERS (Mar. 
14, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/03/14/why-does-hulk-hogan-even-have-a-
case-against-gawker/ [https://perma.cc/ZP6A-6SBQ]. 
123. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
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shows a similar tendency to erase all nuance.124 Even when the most 
knowledgeable sources are consulted, they tend to offer misleadingly 
abridged interpretations for lay audiences. Immediately after the Bartnicki 
ruling, Yocum’s lawyer, Tom Goldstein, said a key takeaway from the 
case was that “if you’re the press, you don’t have to worry about reporting 
truthful information of public concern.”125 And one can find many other 
examples of thumbnail assessments from media law experts that go too 
far in flattening these issues for the public.126 
One cannot expect experts, in quotes or soundbites, to convey all of the 
complexities of a decision like Bartnicki. Nevertheless, the popular, 
received wisdom about Bartnicki, and certainly Pentagon Papers, often 
comes in the form of terse absolutes. There is a palpable press-protective 
mythos surrounding both of these rulings, which is perhaps the result of 
media accounts that tend to wash away the uncertainties. Journalists and 
others who share information online have perhaps become unduly 
emboldened by this. That was likely true of Gawker editor Nick Denton 
whose unrepentant publication of a celebrity sex tape ultimately killed his 
whole enterprise.127 Others should heed the Gawker lesson, but also 
recognize that even in Pentagon Papers, some justices explicitly left open 
the possibility of post-publication charges against The New York Times 
for publishing classified material.128 And Bartnicki itself was not a home 
run for the press, and perhaps not even a “win.” Indeed, as First 
 
124. Tor Ekeland, The Law Being Used to Prosecute Julian Assange Is Broken, WIRED (May 7, 
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/julian-assange-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/G35T-5X7Q] (asserting that “Assange and WikiLeaks are publishers just like The 
New York Times . . . [a]nd if it was legal for The New York Times to publish the classified Pentagon 
Papers detailing the US’ lies when it came to Vietnam, it’s legal for WikiLeaks to do the same”) . 
125. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Ruling Supports Media Rights over Privacy Law, WASH. POST 
(May 22, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/05/22/supreme-court-
ruling-supports-media-rights-over-privacy-law/d5e2c04b-f190-4f12-a708-aae1fb69043f/ 
[https://perma.cc/8P9U-EJ32]. 
126. One typical example is a story analyzing Jason Pierre-Paul’s lawsuit against Adam Schefter 
for publishing part of Pierre-Paul’s medical record that appeared to have been illegally released or 
acquired by someone else. The story quotes a media law expert who said, “[a]s long as ESPN did 
nothing to procure the documents or aid and abet in their procurement . . . ESPN is in the free and 
clear.” Erik Wemple, Twitter Stupidly Freaks Out About ESPN, Jason Pierre-Paul and HIPAA, 
WASH. POST (July 9, 2015, 6:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-
wemple/wp/2015/07/09/twitter-stupidly-freaks-out-about-espn-jason-pierre-paul-and-hipaa/ 
[https://perma.cc/HS5P-X626]. 
127. Les Neuhaus, Nick Denton, on Stand, Justifies Posting of Hulk Hogan Sex Video, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/business/media/nick-denton-on-stand-
justifies-posting-of-hulk-hogan-sex-video.html/ [https://perma.cc/9AKW-SX8J]. 
128. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 735–37 (1971) (White, J., 
concurring) (noting various criminal laws that explicitly prohibit publishing classified and other 
sensitive information relating to national security and saying he would have “no difficulty in 
sustaining convictions under these [laws]”). 
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Amendment scholar Amy Gajda points out, it could actually be viewed as 
a 5-4 ruling against the press in the sense that the majority of justices 
acknowledged that there are times when speech must yield to privacy.129 
All of this points to the need for clarity, partly from news organizations 
covering these issues, but more importantly from courts applying these 
precedents and shaping new outcomes. The analysis in Part III looks in 
more detail at how courts have interpreted and applied Bartnicki over the 
past two decades to see if they offer insights for courts confronting a new 
wave of cases like the espionage prosecution of Julian Assange, the 
criminal hacking prosecutions of Glenn Greenwald130 and Barrett 
Brown,131 the DNC data-dumping lawsuits,132 the leak cases like those 
involving Donald Trump (tax records),133 Jason Pierre-Paul (medical 
records)134 and Jeff Bezos (communication records),135 and some other 
emerging cases and scenarios, including the risks faced by average web 
users who might seek to share or re-post information online. 
III. ANALYSIS OF CASES 
The ambiguities of Bartnicki have forced lower courts over the past two 
decades to try to clarify and extrapolate from it, much like they did after 
Branzburg. A focal point of this Article was to examine all of the federal 
and state cases applying Bartnicki to see how lower courts have answered 
the questions the Supreme Court left open in 2001, to identify clear or 
budding points of consensus, and to see if any new dilemmas have arisen. 
The analysis here reveals that courts are deeply divided about the 
meaning of every element of the Bartnicki test. There is a circuit split over 
the extent to which a publisher can interact with a source before 
effectively becoming a primary participant in the illegal acquisition of 
information. Courts are also divided about the relevance of legal 
prohibitions on receiving or possessing certain information, with some 
courts effectively treating certain types of information as contraband and 
 
129. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A 
FREE PRESS 48–49 (2015). 
130. See supra note 23. 
131. Brown, who had previously been involved with the hacker group Anonymous, spent four years 
in jail after posting a link to a trove of files hacked from the cyber-security firm Stratfor, which turned 
out to contain some credit card numbers. Russell Brandom, Barrett Brown Has Been Sentenced to 63 
Months in Prison, THE VERGE (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/22/7871
317/barrett-brown-sentencing-anonymous-stratfor [https://perma.cc/8W99-LDKF]. 
132. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
133. See infra text accompanying note 229. 
134. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
135. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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creating legal risks for journalists for merely requesting non-public 
records, even when those records are newsworthy and ultimately 
furnished by the government. There is also some lingering confusion 
about how to assess the newsworthiness of a publication and whether 
courts should focus on the newsworthiness of particular facts or the 
newsworthiness of the broader context. This is critical in cases involving 
large caches of data, like in the DNC hacking cases where courts have 
taken diametric approaches to the public concern criterion, with one 
saying publishers must demonstrate the newsworthiness of every 
disclosed fact, and the other focusing on the macro-level impact of 
the whole. 
The primary sources for this analysis were the opinions of federal and 
state courts that analyzed, discussed, or cited Bartnicki when determining 
the case outcome. The time frame used was 2001, the year Bartnicki was 
decided, through the end of 2019. The examined cases were gathered 
using LexisNexis and Shepard’s Citation Service. The initial search 
yielded 229 cases across all jurisdictions, which were then categorized 
using Shepard’s depth of discussion indicator (“analyzed,” “discussed,” 
“mentioned,” and “cited”). All cases were examined, but many of them, 
particularly those that merely cited or mentioned Bartnicki, did not 
contain enough relevant analysis or contextual clues to warrant deeper 
review. A total of seventeen cases “analyzed” Bartnicki and another 
twenty-five “discussed” it.136 The analysis of cases was oriented around 
the following questions: 
Prong one—What actions have courts treated as “illegal” in applying 
prong one? How have lower courts treated the relationship between the 
source and publisher and the legal significance of their interactions with 
each other? Relatedly, have courts used the Breyer contingencies137 as 
bases for withholding First Amendment protection? 
Prong two—What do the lower courts regard as unlawful acquisition? 
Have courts fully denied First Amendment protection to those who 
acquired information unlawfully? 
Prong three—What types of information have the courts identified as 
being of public concern or not of public concern, and how have they 
balanced information of public interest against privacy or other social 
interests? 
These and other questions are addressed in the subsections below, 
along with some discussion of their implications for present as well as 
 
136. There were also a few cases that were examined but that did not have a depth of discussion 
label. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
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future cases and controversies. 
It is important to be clear about the distinctions between prong one and 
prong two. The first is about procurement; the second is about receipt and 
possession. Lower courts have not always carefully distinguished the two. 
In addition, there are two varieties of activity under prong one. For 
purposes of this analysis, defendants lose prong one protection when they 
directly engage in illegal behavior in order to acquire information in the 
first place. This will be referred to here as primary participation. In 
addition, some courts have pointed to the narrow facts of Bartnicki and to 
some of the language in Stevens’s and Breyer’s opinions to conclude that 
a defendant might also fail prong one by indirectly—but too closely—
participating in illegally securing the information by, for example, 
collaborating, inducing, encouraging, or supporting that activity. This will 
be referred to here as secondary participation.138 Prong two, by contrast, 
is less commonly implicated and only involves situations in which, like in 
Bartnicki, the defendant was not involved in the initial procuring of the 
information but where, unlike in Bartnicki, their receipt or possession of 
the information was specifically proscribed by law.139 
A. Bartnicki Prong One: Publisher-Source Interaction 
Although the Supreme Court in Bartnicki upheld the rights of both 
Yocum as the intermediary and Vopper as the publisher, it clearly had no 
sympathy for whoever initially broke the law by intercepting the 
Kane-Bartnicki phone conversation. That person engaged in a clear 
violation of the wiretap statutes, and the privacy-protection justifications 
for punishing those actions were substantial and self-evident. This aspect 
of the Court’s opinion is supported by a long line of cases denying legal 
immunity to journalists or others whose newsgathering activities violate 
generally applicable laws.140 Many of the post-Bartnicki cases have turned 
on this aspect of prong one. The application of Bartnicki in those cases 
has been relatively straightforward because they involved defendants who 
acted illegally in procuring the information and were the first link in 
the chain. 
 
138. A key question for this analysis is whether a secondary participant is eligible for Bartnicki 
protection, and what types of secondary participation fall within the ambit of Bartnicki.  
139. Because both prong one and two involve unlawful activity—under prong one, unlawfulness 
in securing the information in the first place, and under prong two, unlawfulness in receiving or 
possessing the information—the courts sometimes blur the two. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, 
Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (noting that in one case a defendant participated in 
an illegal interception and therefore “did not lawfully receive the contents” (emphasis in original)), 
superseded, 414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44. 
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In In re Zyprexa Injunction,141 for example, a federal district court in 
New York rejected the invocation of Bartnicki by lawyers seeking to resist 
a court order compelling them to return, and cease distributing, court 
documents that were under a protective order.142 In Council on 
American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz,143 a 
different federal district court held that a defendant who lied to get an 
internship at a private organization could not rely on Bartnicki to shield 
him from liability for accessing and publishing the organization’s private 
records.144 In State v. Baron,145 the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied 
Bartnicki protection to a defendant who distributed his supervisor’s 
private emails after gaining unauthorized access to the supervisor’s 
computer and email account.146 And in Bowens v. Ary, Inc.,147 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals denied Bartnicki protection to defendants who 
had illegally recorded, and later distributed, video and audio of a 
backstage dispute between musicians and police.148 In all of these cases, 
the defendants directly participated in the illegal acquisition of 
information and were not merely recipients of information captured 
by others. 
Some courts, like the First Circuit,149 have framed Bartnicki in simple 
terms: people are free to disclose illegally intercepted information 
provided they have not “participated in the interception.”150 But decisions 
by other courts, including two circuit courts,151 show there is no bright 
 
141. 474 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
142. Id. at 420–22. The documents were part of a class-action lawsuit against Eli Lilly & Co., 
maker of the drug Zyprexa. The lawyers, who were participants in the case, leaked the documents to 
journalists and others, and parts were shared on websites and in news reports. The only surviving 
injunction in this case was aimed at the lawyers, not the journalists or subsequent publishers. Id. 
at 427.  
143. 793 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2011). 
144. Id. at 331–32. In that case, the defendant’s actions also violated the confidentiality agreement 
he signed as a condition of his employment. Id. at 342–44.  
145. 2009 WI 58, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. 
146. Id. ¶¶ 55–56, 318 Wis. 2d at 87–88, 769 N.W.2d at 48. 
147. No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2009). 
148. Id. at *20–22. After musicians had been preparing to show sexually explicit material during a 
concert performance, police intervened and, during a backstage discussion, were recorded by 
defendants while conversing with performers and managers. The recordings, which violated the 
wiretap laws, were later included on a DVD that was subsequently distributed by the band. Id. at     
*1–2.  
149. See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a New 
Hampshire statute prohibiting certain transfers of physician’s prescribing history did not violate First 
Amendment rights of data miners). 
150. Id. at 51. 
151. Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner II), 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that that a 
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line here. A determinative feature of Bartnicki was certainly the 
disconnection between Vopper and the person who illegally intercepted 
the Kane-Bartnicki phone call. Similarly, in Pentagon Papers, the 
separation between the source (Daniel Ellsberg) and the newspapers made 
the case a simpler one for the justices.152 In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens’s 
opinion highlighted the fact that the illegal interception was committed by 
a stranger and someone who was further separated from Vopper by an 
intermediary, Yocum.153 Stevens did not limit his opinion to cases in 
which the interceptor and publisher were so far removed, but by not 
drawing a clear line, he left a crack in the door that Breyer pushed open 
by flagging a set of alternative conditions that, if present, might warrant 
different outcomes.154 Justice Breyer implied that a stronger link of 
liability might be forged between source and publisher in situations in 
which the publisher ordered, counseled, encouraged, or aided and abetted 
the illegal acquisition or the subsequent transfer of records from one node 
to another.155 If lower courts have indeed seized on Breyer’s 
contingencies, it could have significant implications for many defendants, 
including Julian Assange, who had many direct interactions with his 
source, Chelsea Manning.156 
The first federal circuit case applying Bartnicki was by the Tenth 
Circuit in Quigley v. Rosenthal.157 That case involved a fierce dispute 
between neighbors in which a Jewish couple, the Aronsons, claimed their 
neighbors, the Quigleys, were trying to run them out of the neighborhood. 
The Aronsons repeatedly intercepted and recorded the Quigleys’ home 
phone calls, capturing the Quigleys making what the Aronsons believed 
were anti-Semitic and threatening comments.158 The Aronsons consulted 
lawyers for the Anti-Defamation League who eventually filed civil claims 
on behalf of the Aronsons against the Quigleys, incorporating excerpts 
from the illegally intercepted phone conversations.159 The Quigleys 
 
Congressman who knowingly disclosed unlawfully intercepted communications in violation of 
federal statute was not entitled to First Amendment protections); Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding that the application of a federal wiretap act did not violate defendants’ First 
Amendment rights). 
152. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
153. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. Breyer also notes that the wiretap laws did not 
forbid the receipt of intercepted communications, supra text accompanying note 97, an issue that is 
more relevant to prong two and discussed in the next section. 
155. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
156. See infra text accompanying notes 230–232. 
157. 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003). 
158. Id. at 1052. 
159. Id. at 1052–53. 
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subsequently filed their own claims against various defendants, including 
the ADL, which the Quigleys accused of violating the state and federal 
wiretap laws when its lawyers used the illegally intercepted calls in their 
court filings on behalf of the Aronsons.160 The ADL invoked Bartnicki, 
but the Tenth Circuit concluded that it was distinguishable, in part 
because, unlike Yocum and Vopper, the ADL “knew that the Aronsons 
were the ones responsible for recording the Quigleys’ telephone 
conversations” and knew that “the Aronsons were continuing to record 
the Aronsons’ telephone conversations.”161 
The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion is plainly inconsistent with Stevens’s 
Bartnicki opinion, which acknowledges that the defendants knew or had 
reason to know that the Kane-Bartnicki call had been illegally 
intercepted.162 The Tenth Circuit effectively splits this phrase, however, 
implying that those who merely have “reason to know” about the illegal 
interception can invoke the First Amendment while those who are more 
certain about it may not.163 The Tenth Circuit was correct that the two 
cases are factually distinct—in one, the defendants had actual knowledge 
of illegal interception (Quigley), and in the other, they merely suspected 
it (Bartnicki)—but there is nothing in Stevens’s opinion, either by itself 
or read together with Breyer’s concurrence, to suggest that this distinction 
has constitutional relevance. In fact, it contradicts the fifth sentence of 
Stevens’s opinion for the Court in which he conjoins knowledge and 
suspicion by presenting them as gradations of the same condition.164 
Nevertheless, a few years later, another federal circuit, the D.C. Circuit, 
applied similar logic in perhaps the most high-profile post-Bartnicki 
ruling—Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner II).165 The Boehner litigation 
ran parallel to the Bartnicki litigation but was not ultimately resolved until 
2007 after multiple rulings, appeals, and remands.166 The case involved a 
civil claim filed under the federal wiretap law by Republican 
Representative John Boehner against Democratic Representative James 
 
160. Id. at 1056. 
161. Id. at 1067. The court further distinguished Bartnicki by suggesting that the Quigley phone 
calls did not involve matters of public concern. Id.  
162. Bartnicki v.Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (“The persons who made the disclosures 
did not participate in the interception, but they did know—or at least had reason to know—that the 
interception was unlawful.”). 
163. Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1078. 
164. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18. 
165. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The case was finally resolved later after an en 
banc review. Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner III), 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
166. For a full account of this case’s journey through the courts, prior to the final en banc ruling of 
the D.C. Circuit, see William R. Self, Boehner v. McDermott: Full Appeals Court Avoids Attempting 
to Solve the Riddle of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 43 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 154 (2006). 
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McDermott.167 A married couple, the Martins, used a radio scanner to 
illegally intercept and record a private conference call between Boehner 
and other members of Congress, including Republican Representative 
Newt Gingrich, in which they discussed the disposition of a House Ethics 
Committee punishment of Gingrich, and revealed that Gingrich might 
have violated his settlement agreement with the committee.168 The couple 
gave a tape of the call to McDermott who subsequently contacted two 
reporters, played the tape for them, and allowed them to make their 
own recordings.169 
In its penultimate ruling on this case, Boehner II, a panel of the D.C. 
Circuit ruled in favor of Boehner and highlighted the fact that, unlike the 
defendants in Bartnicki, McDermott knew (rather than merely suspected) 
that the information given to him had been illegally intercepted.170 “The 
difference between this case and Bartnicki is plain to see,” Judge 
Randolph wrote for the court. “It is the difference between someone who 
discovers a bag containing a diamond ring on the sidewalk and someone 
who accepts the same bag from a thief, knowing the ring inside to have 
been stolen.”171 This is a plainly specious argument because the wiretap 
law did not outlaw the mere possession of intercepted communications, 
and courts have also been reluctant to treat information as property.172 The 
D.C. Circuit, then, like the Tenth, treated the certainty of the defendants’ 
knowledge of the illegal acquisition as a constitutionally significant factor 
in applying and distinguishing Bartnicki. 
In Boehner II, D.C. Circuit also highlighted a related factor: the 
anonymity of the interceptor. In Bartnicki, the defendants never knew who 
recorded the original phone call. The D.C. Circuit suggests that this was 
significant because “[t]he Court mentioned the anonymity of the 
interceptor several times” in its opinion.173 Justice Stevens’s opinion does 
 
167. Boehner II, 441 F.3d at 1011. 
168. Id. at 1012. 
169. Id. at 1012–13. The reporters later published news stories based on the recordings. Id. 
170. Id. at 1016. The Martins had written an explanatory note on the outside the envelope 
explaining its contents. Id. at 1012. McDermott denied having read it. Id. at 1015–16 Nevertheless, 
McDermott was later quoted in a newspaper story about the recording in which he indicated it had 
been captured using a radio scanner. Id. at 1016. He could only have known this, the court concluded, 
from either his direct contacts with the Martins or from the note on the envelope. Id. at 1016–17. 
Either way, the Court held that the evidence supported the conclusion that McDermott knew the 
recording he shared with reporters had been illegally acquired. Id.  
171. Id. at 1017. 
172. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concluding that information 
should not be treated as property except in situations in which it constitutes a literary work, scientific 
invention or the like). 
173. Boehner II, 441 F. 3d at 1014 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525, 530, 530 n.15, 
531, 535 (2001)). 
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refer to the interceptor as a stranger, and his opinion concludes by noting 
that “a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”174 But 
Stevens never suggests or implies that an interceptor must be anonymous 
for a publisher to invoke the First Amendment. Indeed, he just as 
frequently uses terms such as “third party”175 or “another.”176 
A year after Boehner II, the D.C. Circuit granted an appeal for a 
rehearing en banc and issued its final judgment in the case in Boehner v. 
McDermott (Boehner III),177 with four judges, led by Randolph, siding 
with Boehner, four judges, led by Sentelle, siding with McDermott, and 
one judge, Griffith, concurring.178 This time Judge Randolph tethered his 
opinion to an entirely different rationale—the fact that McDermott had a 
special duty as a member of the ethics committee not to disclose 
confidential material.179 “When Representative McDermott became a 
member of the Ethics Committee,” Judge Randolph wrote, “he voluntarily 
accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of 
the Martins’ illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right 
to disclose the tape to the media.”180 Because Judge Randolph oriented his 
argument around this point, he never revisited the issues of knowledge or 
direct contact he stressed in Boehner II.181 Judge Sentelle, however, not 
wanting to leave those specious assertions unchallenged, wrote a strong 
dissent in Boehner III, emphasizing that the panel’s rationale in 
Boehner II could not stand as a matter of law or logic. Sentelle argued that 
there is no constitutionally significant difference between the facts of 
 
174. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535. 
175. Id. at 529–30 (“But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding 
possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding 
third party.”). 
176. Id. at 530. 
177. 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
178. Judge Randolph’s opinion was joined by Chief Judge Ginsburg, Judge Henderson, and Judge 
Brown. Id. at 574–75. Judge Sentelle’s dissent was joined by Judges Rogers, Tatel and Garland. Id. 
at 581 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Griffith concurred, joining Part I of Judge Randolph’s opinion 
in which the court ruled in favor of Boehner. Id. at 575 (majority opinion); id. at 581 (Griffith, J., 
concurring in part). 
179. Id. at 581 (majority opinion). 
180. Id.; see also discussion infra section III.B. 
181. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1016 (2006). These issues were stressed again by the district court 
that heard the remand of the case, the appeal of which became Boehner III. Boehner v. McDermott, 
332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2004) (“In the instant case, however, McDermott actively 
accepted the tape from the people who had illegally recorded it” and in doing so “participated in an 
illegal transaction” and therefore “he is without First Amendment protection.”). 
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Bartnicki and Boehner.182 
In both cases, the defendant publisher knew or had reason to know that 
the information had been illegally intercepted, and there is nothing in the 
Bartincki opinion to suggest that the outcome would be different had the 
defendants known the identity of the interceptor or been more certain 
about the illegality of the original interception.183 In his decisive 
concurring opinion, Judge Griffith joined the majority in finding that the 
First Amendment was inapplicable because of McDermott’s overriding 
duty of non-disclosure; however, he noted that but for that condition, he 
would have found McDermott’s disclosure to be protected by the First 
Amendment.184 In the final analysis, a slight majority of the judges of the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the notion that one surrenders Bartnicki protection 
by virtue of knowing the identity of the original interceptor or knowing 
with certainty that the material was illegally acquired. 
That same year, the First Circuit mirrored the Sentelle interpretation in 
Jean v. Massachusetts State Police.185 In Jean, a woman whose home was 
being searched by police, recorded the police without their knowledge 
using a nanny-cam.186 The footage included audio of the officers’ 
conversations with each other and with the homeowner, which made the 
recording illegal under the Massachusetts wiretap law.187 The 
homeowner, who believed the search to be unjustified, sent the recording 
to Mary Jean, who operated a website monitoring police misconduct.188 
After the footage was posted online, the police sought to have it removed, 
but Jean was able to secure an injunction prohibiting any interference with 
the website.189 
Aside from the posture of the case (the merits of an injunction), the 
facts closely matched those in Bartnicki. The homeowner plainly violated 
the wiretap law, but Jean played no role in the illegal recording. The 
police, relying on Justice Breyer’s Bartnicki concurrence and paralleling 
the arguments from Quigley and Boehner II, argued that Jean was 
differently situated than Vopper because she was aware of the identity of 
the illegal interceptor, had direct contact with her, and knew with certainty 
 
182. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 584 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“There is no distinction of legal, let 
alone constitutional, significance between our facts and those before the Court in Bartnicki.”) 
183. Id. at 581–87. 
184. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring in part). 
185. 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007). 
186. Id. at 25. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 24–25.  
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that the recording was made in violation of the law.190 The court 
concluded that none of these was a material fact.191 It is true that in 
Bartnicki, Yocum received the recording blindly, which is different than 
Jean, who consulted directly with the homeowner,192 but, the First Circuit 
wrote, “the fact that Yocum received the tape ‘passively’ and Jean 
received the tape ‘actively’ is a distinction without a difference.”193 The 
First Circuit further rejected the notion that simple logistical 
communications between Jean and the homeowner about publication 
somehow conjoined them for purposes of wiretap-law culpability. Finally, 
the court acknowledged Justice Breyer’s concurrence but declined to use 
it as the basis for a narrower reading of Bartnicki.194 
One federal district court applying Bartnicki aptly noted “that the more 
involvement journalists have in obtaining information by illegal means, 
the more likely their publication of that material will not receive First 
Amendment protection.”195 But there is a circuit split about how to bridge 
the extremes—at one end, situations in which a publisher breaks the law 
to acquire information, and at the other end, situations like Bartnicki 
where the publisher is fully removed from the illegal acquisition. The 
Tenth Circuit in Quigley offered one approach, saying publishers lose 
Bartnicki protection if they know the information provided by a source 
was illegally obtained.196 Four of the nine D.C. Circuit judges who sat en 
banc in Boehner III agreed, adding that the same would be true if the 
publisher had personal interactions with the sources who provided the 
illegally acquired information.197 Judge Hogan’s district court decision 
 
190. Id. at 31–32. 
191. Id. at 32. 
192. Indeed, the Third Circuit even acknowledged that Jean and the homeowner engaged in a 
“conspiracy” to disclose the recording, but the court concluded that it was of no constitutional 
relevance. Id. at 31–32. 
193. Id. at 32. 
194. Id. at 33 (concluding that “the precise scope of [that] language is uncertain” but that in any 
case Jean’s actions did not fit any of the possible exceptions noted by Breyer). 
195. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded, 414 
F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
196. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067 (10th Cir. 2003). Some lower courts applying 
Bartnicki have addressed the issue of knowledge, but only to consider whether the defendants even 
knew the information they were publishing had been illegally obtained or that its dissemination was 
prohibited. See, e.g., Wingrave v. Hebert, 2006-1240 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/9/07); 964 So. 2d 385 (finding 
no clear evidence that defendant knew information she distributed had been illegally intercepted); 
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003) (addressing issue of knowledge of illegal 
acquisition but only to establish basis for underlying tort claim of trade secret misappropriation). 
197. Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 577–79 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The only path to reconcile Quigley with 
Bartnicki is to argue that the latter involved mere suspicion of illegality whereas in the former the 
defendants were certain, and that this is a legally significant distinction. 
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preceding Boehner II and Boehner III also supported this interpretation.198 
But five of the nine judges on the D.C. Circuit in Boehner III, and a 
unanimous panel of the First Circuit, said that neither of those 
conditions—knowledge of illegal acquisition nor personal contact 
between publisher and source—is sufficient to remove the Bartnicki 
shield, although it is not clear how much further they might be willing to 
extend protections.199 
There is one more federal circuit decision that offers some guidance—
Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.200—decided just prior to Bartnicki. In that case, 
a reporter had been in close consultation with a couple who had been 
illegally intercepting and recording their neighbor’s phone calls, believing 
that the neighbor (Carver Dan Peavy) was engaged in criminal activity. 
The reporter sought to expose Peavy, relying on information gleaned from 
the couple’s recordings.201 The reporter spoke with the couple regularly 
for months, often meeting them at their house, occasionally listening to 
the recorded conversations with them, and providing some technical 
advice to them about recording techniques.202 The Fifth Circuit denied the 
reporter’s First Amendment defense, and the Supreme Court subsequently 
denied certiorari following its decision in Bartnicki.203 Although the Court 
never addressed the merits of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Justice 
Stevens’s opinion did note that in Peavy, unlike Bartnicki, the “media 
defendant in fact participated in the interceptions at issue.”204 
Peavy provides an example of a situation in which a court might 
withhold First Amendment protection because of a too-close connection 
between reporters and sources, even where the reporter is one step 
removed from the actual procurement. It is perhaps the kind of situation 
Breyer had in mind when he implied that liability might attach to those 
who encourage illegal acquisition or participate in it, “directly or 
indirectly.”205 Other lower courts have not deeply explored the gradations 
of this kind of secondary participation, however, so while the loophole 
 
198. Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 168 (D.D.C. 2004). 
199. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring in the result) (noting that he agreed with 
the minority and would find the disclosure protected under Bartnicki if not for the House ethics rules 
violations); Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding Bartnicki applied to 
the knowing publication of an illegally intercepted recording).  
200. 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). 
201. Id. at 164–65. 
202. Id. at 164–67. 
203. Id. at 194; Order Denying Certiorari, Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).  
204. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 n.5 (2001) (emphasis added). 
205. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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Breyer created has not been exploited by plaintiffs,206 it has not been 
closed either.207 
That lingering uncertainty is consequential because the issue of 
reporter-source (or interceptor-publisher) proximity is at the center of 
several emerging cases. It was explored in the 2019 federal district court 
rulings in both of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) hacking 
cases—one case brought by DNC donors and staffers against the Trump 
Campaign (Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.208) and the 
other brought by the DNC itself against the Russian Federation and a 
number of secondary defendants, including the Trump Campaign, 
WikiLeaks, Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Julian Assange and Jared 
Kushner (Democratic National Committee (DNC) v. Russian 
Federation209). In Cockrum, which involved defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, Judge Hudson found the evidence to be “more than ample” to at 
least establish a “plausible factual basis” for the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendants coordinated with the Russian hackers.210 As a result, Hudson 
distinguished Bartnicki based on prong one, noting that “[h]ere, unlike 
Bartnicki, the Campaign is alleged to have conspired with the Kremlin 
and WikiLeaks.”211 Judge Hudson muddled the issue, however, by saying 
that this evidence demonstrates that the “Campaign was aware that the 
stolen information had been unlawfully obtained.”212 Hudson therefore 
 
206. In Quigley v. Rosenthal, the Tenth Circuit noted that during a meeting between the Aronsons 
and their lawyers, “[t]he attendees . . . agreed that the Aronsons should continue recording the 
Quigleys’ telephone conversations.” 327 F.3d 1044, 1052 (10th Cir. 2003). This appeared to be 
evidence that the lawyers encouraged the illegal interception of information by the Aronsons, which 
aligns with one of the Breyer contingencies, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring), but 
the court never returned to this point, perhaps because it has already established that mere knowledge 
of illegal acquisition was sufficient to deny Bartnicki protection. In some other cases, it also appeared 
that there might have been some interaction and coordination between sources and publishers, but 
either the court did not elaborate, or the facts were unclear. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 
403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 571 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting factual dispute about how defendant news 
organization obtained sealed court records), superseded, 414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
207. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit case Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC puts considerable 
emphasis on the Breyer concurrence in denying First Amendment protection to reporters, but with a 
focus on the second prong of the Bartnicki test. 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015); see also discussion 
infra section III.B. 
208. 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019). 
209. 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
210. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 658. Judge Hudson granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
all of the claims but without any further discussion of Bartnicki, because the claims were 
unsustainable for other reasons. Id. at 672. 
211. Id. at 657. 
212. Id. at 658 (emphasis added). 
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confused active collaboration with knowledge of illegal acquisition.213 
Ultimately, Hudson concluded that based on the available evidence, “the 
Campaign’s release of the hacked emails from the DNC do not warrant 
First Amendment protection.”214 
In the DNC case, however, Judge Koeltl interpreted Bartnicki in the 
broadest possible terms, framing the issue as a simple distinction between 
“stealing documents and disclosing documents that someone else had 
stolen previously.”215 He acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
various secondary defendants “actively supported and approved the 
Russian operation,”216 but noted that all of this occurred after the emails 
had already been hacked. Because the DNC “failed to allege plausibly that 
any of the other defendants participated in the hack or theft,”217 or that 
they conspired to do so before the incidents occurred,218 they are entitled 
to First Amendment protection under Bartnicki. Judge Koeltl observed 
that the plaintiffs’ strongest claim was against WikiLeaks because it was 
the only one of the secondary defendants to have actually published the 
stolen emails and because WikiLeaks actually solicited the emails via 
direct communication with the Russians.219 The plaintiffs argued that 
WikiLeaks could not claim Bartnicki protection because it knowingly 
published stolen information. But Judge Koeltl, citing Boehner III and 
Jean, concluded that it is “constitutionally insignificant that WikiLeaks 
knew the Russian Federation had stolen the documents when it published 
them.”220 It is also irrelevant, he added, that WikiLeaks solicited the 
emails from the Russians. Soliciting stolen documents is a common 
journalistic practice, Judge Koeltl asserted, and to hold WikiLeaks liable 
for doing so would “eviscerate Bartnicki.”221 The solicitation by 
WikiLeaks occurred after the documents had already been stolen, and 
indeed after the Russians had already started to distribute them. “This was 
not a solicitation to steal documents but a request for material,” Judge 
Koeltl concluded, adding that “[j]ournalists are allowed to request 
 
213. An alternative explanation is that Judge Hudson meant only that the collaboration served to 
alert the campaign about the illegal interception, not that the campaign coordinated more directly with 
the hackers. 
214. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 659. 
215. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
216. Id. at 421. 
217. Id. at 434. 
218. Id. at 435. 
219. Id.  
220. Id. at 434 (first citing Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); 
and then citing Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
221. Id. at 435. 
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documents that have been stolen and to publish those documents.”222 
In another 2019 case, Allen v. Beirich,223 a different federal district 
court judge cited DNC and mirrored its analysis, holding that defendants 
could not be liable for publishing illegally leaked documents despite 
knowing the documents were stolen, coordinating with the person who 
stole them, and paying that person $5,000 as a reward.224 None of these 
facts was constitutionally significant, the court held, in part because the 
coordination and payment occurred after the source had already stolen the 
documents.225 For both Judge Koeltl, who decided DNC,226 and Judge 
Blake, who decided Allen, the key distinction is between before-the-fact 
participation, conspiracy or solicitation, on the one hand, and 
after-the-fact solicitation on the other. To Judge Hudson, however, who 
decided Cockrum, any of the above conditions could conceivably negate 
the protection. 
This division and imprecision pervades the post-Bartnicki case law and 
creates uneven legal terrain for potential defendants like columnist 
Nicholas Kristof, who arguably engaged in before-the-fact solicitation by 
tweeting out a request in 2017 for leaks of Donald Trump’s tax records.227 
Reporters for The New York Times could also be vulnerable. In May 2019, 
the Times published a story about Trump’s previous financial losses that 
was based on a leak of parts of ten years of Trump’s tax returns.228 And in 
October 2020, the Times published a series of stories exploring different 
aspects of Trump’s finances, again based on leaked tax records.229 The 
Times’s sources are not known, but if Times’s reporters asked those 
sources for the records, the reporters’ actions would fall outside of the 
zone of Bartnicki protection suggested by Judge Hogan. 
The problems are more serious for Julian Assange, whom prosecutors 
 
222. Id. at 436 (first citing Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007); then citing 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); and then citing 
Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 521 (1986)). 
223. No. CCB-18-3781, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197183 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2019). 
224. Id. at *24. 
225. Id. at *16–18. 
226. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 451. 
227. See Kristof, supra note 20; supra text accompanying note 20. 
228. Russ Buettner & Susanne Craig, Decade in the Red: Trump Tax Figures Show over $1 Billion 
in Business Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/07/us
/politics/donald-trump-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/PY9H-9HBF]. 
229. Russ Buettner, Susanne Craig & Mike McIntire, Long-Concealed Records Show Trump’s 
Chronic Losses and Years of Tax Avoidance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/27/us/donald-trump-taxes.html?smid=tw-
nytimes&amp;smtyp=cur [https://perma.cc/RM5L-TBGV]. 
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say had sustained and detailed contacts with Chelsea Manning before230 
and during231 the transfer of classified data to WikiLeaks. The Assange 
indictment repeatedly mentions the word “encourage,” suggesting that in 
the government’s view, before-the-fact encouragement of illegal leaks by 
sources is enough to warrant withholding First Amendment protection, 
but that, in any case, Assange went well beyond that by actively 
collaborating with Manning.232 For Assange to succeed, then, he will first 
have to convince the court to apply an interpretation of Bartnicki that 
reserves liability for those who actively conspire with their sources. (This 
Article largely supports this approach,233 and it is not precluded by 
Stevens’s opinion for the Court, but is harder to square with Breyer’s 
concurrence and some subsequent precedent). Assange will then have to 
persuade that court that his interactions with Manning fell short of 
that line.234 
B. Bartnicki Prong Two: Unlawful Acquisition 
The second condition for claiming Bartnicki protection is that the 
publisher obtained the information “lawfully,”235 and like with prong one, 
courts have applied it inconsistently. Although some courts have blurred 
the distinction between prong one and two,236 prong two applies only to 
situations in which a publisher received information from a third party 
where the receipt or possession of that information was itself proscribed 
by law. 
One of the most restrictive interpretations of prong two came from the 
 
230. The indictment notes that Manning’s first involvement with WikiLeaks was to search for 
specific classified records (e.g., CIA detainee interrogation videos) sought by WikiLeaks via a “Most 
Wanted Leaks” appeal on its website. The website also solicited records in “bulk databases and 
military and intelligence categories,” which is what Manning ultimately provided to WikiLeaks—full 
databases of war-related activity reports from Iraq and Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay detainee 
records, and about a quarter million State Department cables. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra 
note 6, at 5–6. 
231. The government alleges that Assange and Manning engaged in regular correspondence, id. at 
6, and that Assange continued to encourage the leak of additional records after receiving the first 
batches, id. at 6–7, which Assange knew were classified, id. at 9, and might put individuals at risk, 
id. at 26. The indictment also alleges Assange offered technical advice to Manning about how to 
circumvent password protections. Id. at 7. 
232. The words “encourage” or “encouraged” appear ten different times in the first superseding 
indictment. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6. The second superseding indictment 
focuses less on Manning but nevertheless charges Assange with conspiring with Manning. See 
Assange Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 6. 
233. See infra section IV.B. 
234. See discussion infra section IV.B. 
235. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001). 
236. See supra note 139. 
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Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC237 in 2015. That 
case was based on the actions of Chicago Sun-Times reporters who were 
covering a criminal investigation of the nephew of the mayor of Chicago. 
In order to prove that lookalike “fillers” were used in a police lineup to 
make the nephew difficult to identify, the reporters sought information 
about the men, in part by requesting their motor vehicle records from the 
office of the Secretary of State.238 Officials in that office then supplied the 
records without objection or qualification.239 After the reporters included 
some of this information in their subsequent reporting, several police 
officers, who were among the fillers, sued the Sun-Times based on the 
reporters’ alleged violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
(DPPA).240 That law prohibits knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal 
information from motor vehicle records.241 The Seventh Circuit panel 
concluded that the Sun-Times could be held liable because it was 
technically unlawful to acquire such records, so the paper did not qualify 
for Bartnicki protection. The Seventh Circuit focused solely on the 
reporters’ pursuit of protected records, ignoring the intervening actions of 
the records custodians and treating the case as one without 
an intermediary. 
The Dahlstrom decision was mystifying, in part because the facts 
largely paralleled those of the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Star, 
which the Seventh Circuit blithely tried to distinguish. In Florida Star, a 
woman had been raped, and an unredacted report of the incident, which 
contained her full name, was accidentally placed in a press room by an 
employee of the sheriff’s department.242 A reporter then copied the report 
and subsequently published the victim’s name in the paper, which violated 
state law.243 The Supreme Court held that the reporter obtained the 
information lawfully, even though the record included information that 
was not meant to be public, and even though the government officials 
violated their own statutory obligations by releasing it. This is precisely 
what happed in Dahlstrom: information that was not meant to be public 
was mistakenly made available to the press by records custodians in 
 
237. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015). 
238. Id. at 940. 
239. Id. 
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2721. 
241. Id. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal 
information, from a motor vehicle record . . . .”). 
242. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989). 
243. Id. The statute in that case prohibited government officials from releasing the names of rape 
victims, and it also authorized penalties for anyone who published such information. Id. at 526 n.1. 
The latter provision was struck down by the Court as a violation of the right to publish lawfully 
obtained information about matters of public interest. Id. at 526.  
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violation of the statute. The Seventh Circuit glossed over these similarities 
by saying the paper in Florida Star obtained the private information from 
“a public police report.”244 But that report was no more public than the 
information provided to Sun-Times reporters in Dahlstrom. And, as the 
Court noted in Florida Star, “the fact that state officials are not required 
to disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to 
receive them when furnished by the government.”245 Nor does the 
violation of the law by the records custodians make “the newspaper’s 
ensuing receipt of this information unlawful.”246 
The Seventh Circuit suggests that a material difference in Dahlstrom is 
that “the acquirer and publisher are one and the same.”247 The court seems 
to assume that the Supreme Court would have decided Florida Star 
differently if the reporter in that case had first asked for the non-public 
information, and then the government employee mistakenly provided it. 
That seems implausible, and it would require the same kind of logic that 
other courts have rejected248 in their analyses of prong one: that in order 
to invoke Bartnicki, reporters must be oblivious about the provenance of 
the material they acquired. 
In any case, such a rule would present another problem that the 
Supreme Court highlighted in Florida Star: it would shift the burden of 
determining what is private under the statute from records custodians to 
records requesters and would subject the requesters to civil and criminal 
penalties if they guess wrong.249 The Seventh Circuit’s Dahlstrom 
analysis also flies in the face of Judge Koeltl’s observation in DNC that 
seeking information, asking questions, and soliciting records are 
fundamental aspects of journalism and their curtailment certainly 
implicates First Amendment interests.250 
The final way in which the Seventh Circuit sought to distinguish 
 
244. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 951. 
245. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536. 
246. Id. The Court in Florida Star noted that the first step should be for the government to secure 
the privacy of records, not to punish those who happen to obtain them. “Where information is 
entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always 
exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts.” Id. at 534. It made a similar point in 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829, 841 & n.12 (1978) (noting that the State 
could have done more to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings). 
247. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 952. 
248. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007); Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
249. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (“[D]epriving protection to those who rely on the government’s 
implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination, would force upon the media the onerous 
obligation of sifting through government press releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out 
material arguably unlawful for publication.”). 
250. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 436. 
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Dahlstrom from Florida Star was by emphasizing the differences in the 
underlying statute. The DPPA specifically authorizes penalties for both 
“obtaining” and “disclosing” private information from motor vehicle 
records.251 The statute in Florida Star, however, focused solely on 
disclosures of personal information. Similarly, the wiretap laws in 
Bartnicki only prohibited disclosures and uses of illegally intercepted 
communications. After ruling for the defendant in Florida Star, the 
Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a different outcome 
might have been warranted had the statute specifically proscribed the 
obtaining of the name of the rape victim. “Even assuming the Constitution 
permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information,” the Court noted, 
“Florida has not taken this step.”252 The Court acknowledged this issue in 
Bartnicki but did not have a reason to answer it, so the Court left the matter 
open once again.253 
The Seventh Circuit responded by not only assuming that a statutory 
prohibition on possession necessarily precluded Bartnicki protection 
under prong two but by using the most narrow and literal approach 
possible. The Sun-Times reporters argued that their pursuit of truthful, 
newsworthy information held by a government agency is a routine 
journalistic practice, and probably not what the legislature had in mind 
when it drafted the law. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit wrote, the 
Sun-Times “cannot escape the fact that it acquired that truthful 
information unlawfully.”254 It went still further, adding that the statute’s 
prohibition on obtaining information did not implicate any First 
Amendment interests and so was only subject to rational-basis scrutiny.255 
After the Seventh Circuit remanded Dahlstrom, the District Court 
explored more fully the role of the records custodians in the Secretary of 
 
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose 
personal information, from a motor vehicle record . . . .”). 
252. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (emphasis in original); see also Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 585 
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“[T]he otherwise-lawful receipt of unlawfully obtained information remains 
in itself lawful, even where the receiver knows or has reason to know that the source has obtained the 
information unlawfully.”).  
253. In effect the Court in Bartnicki added prong two as an acknowledgement of this open question 
rather than as an attempt to answer it. The Court essentially said that at least where the information 
was lawfully obtained—like it was in Bartnicki, because there was no statutory prohibition on 
receiving the stolen communications—then publishers can disclose that information when it addresses 
matters of public concern. It did not hold that unlawful receipt of information would necessarily 
preclude protection. In that sense, prong two is not a mandatory condition that lower courts must 
follow, but simply an acknowledgement of the facts in front of the Court and the possibility that its 
analysis might be different in other circumstances. 
254. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 951 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
in original). 
255. Id. at 949. 
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State’s office, acknowledging what the Seventh Circuit ignored: that those 
officials violated the DPPA and that the journalists only obtained the 
records as a result of that violation. Nevertheless, the district court held—
without any reference to Florida Star or Bartnicki—that the violation by 
the Secretary of State officials “does not immunize the Sun-Times from 
liability” because “an initial violation by one party does not negate 
subsequent violations by another.”256 But this is precisely the opposite of 
what the Supreme Court held in Florida Star when it made clear that 
where the government itself provides information, it is fair to assume that 
it “had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of guarding against 
dissemination” than imposing liability on a publisher of 
that information.257 
The only difference between Dahlstrom and Florida Star was the 
inclusion of the word “obtain” in the DPPA.258 And if Florida Star and 
Bartnicki protection can be defeated by simply including statutory 
language prohibiting receipt of information, and that language is only 
subject to rational-basis scrutiny, it is an extraordinary loophole. 
Legislatures could easily exploit Dahlstrom by making any unauthorized 
receipt of government information a crime, which would gut Bartnicki 
while giving no sanctuary to journalists who receive leaked information 
from whistleblowers and others. The Seventh Circuit’s approach 
essentially treats information as contraband, allowing the government to 
criminalize its mere possession, and inviting legislatures to skirt Bartnicki 
by adding “obtain” and “possess” prohibitions to every government 
records law. 
This has major implications for people like Julian Assange, and for 
journalists covering national security issues, because some laws like the 
Espionage Act arguably prohibit the possession of classified or other 
sensitive information.259 As a circuit court decision, Dahlstrom is 
 
256. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
257. Fla. Star, 491 U. S. at 538. The Court added that once the government releases information 
“reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast.” Id. This 
principle was also followed in one case applying Bartnicki, Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC v. State. 
183 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a newspaper did not receive information 
unlawfully when it was supplied by the government).  
258. See 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). 
259. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). This section prohibits unauthorized possessors of classified national 
security information—which arguably could include journalists to whom such information has been 
leaked—from communicating or retaining that information. Id. For a thorough analysis of how this 
provision could apply against the press, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage 
Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2007). 
Vladeck notes that in United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), the court upheld 
the conviction of third parties (albeit non-journalists) for conspiring to violate § 793(e). Vladeck, 
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especially important, even though among the post-Bartnicki cases it 
largely stands alone. No other cases have turned on the presence or 
absence of this kind of statutory language. Nevertheless, because the 
Supreme Court reserved the question in several cases, and because a 
circuit court has now supplied an answer, it could have a malignant effect. 
It does not help that the only other circuit court cases touching on the 
prong two notion of unlawful acquisition—Boehner II and Boehner III—
introduced their own complications. In Boehner II, the D.C. Circuit 
largely conflated prong one and prong two by treating McDermott’s 
receipt of the intercepted phone call as unlawful because he knew the 
information was illegally intercepted and had personal interaction with the 
Martins.260 In Boehner III, the full D.C. Circuit, by the narrowest margin, 
abandoned that rationale and instead focused on Rep. McDermott’s 
special obligation under House rules not to reveal confidential 
communications received in his capacity as a member of the Ethics 
Committee.261 Four of the nine Boehner III judges would have maintained 
that McDermott’s receipt of the information was unlawful,262 but that 
issue was left open because the court shifted its focus to McDermott’s 
disclosure. In the end, the D.C. Circuit essentially treated McDermott as 
a records custodian, akin to other government employees who are 
prohibited from revealing private or sensitive government records to 
which they have been entrusted. There are two problems with this. One is 
that McDermott’s obligations were ethical, not legal.263 The other is that, 
to the extent that McDermott had surrendered some of his freedom to 
communicate by virtue of his responsibilities as a member of the 
committee, the analysis of his rights under Bartnicki was misplaced. 
With regard to the first point, McDermott did not violate a criminal 
law, his actions were not tortious, and he did not break an enforceable 
 
supra, at 224. The court concluded that “the government can punish those outside of the government 
for the unauthorized receipt and deliberate retransmission of information relating to the national 
defense.” Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (emphasis added).  
260. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
261. Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“When Representative McDermott became 
a member of the Ethics Committee, he voluntarily accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his 
receipt and handling of the Martins’ illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right to 
disclose the tape to the media.”). This theory was first addressed in the immediately previous district 
court opinion, but that court reached a different conclusion. Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 
149, 163 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[W]hile it is clear that McDermott received the information from the 
Martins in his official political capacity, the Court does not find that he was under an independent 
preexisting duty greater than that required of any citizen.”). 
262. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 577 n.1. 
263. It is not even clear, as Judge Sentelle pointed out in his dissent, that McDermott violated House 
rules. The House report on the matter found only that McDermott’s actions were “inconsistent with 
the spirit of the applicable rules.” Id. at 590 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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contract. The penalties he was subject to were institutional sanctions like 
peer censure and the like. He was not subject to any court-imposed or 
other external sanction. By framing McDermott’s ethical duty as a legal 
obligation and identifying no limiting conditions, the D.C. Circuit 
endorsed a boundary-less exception to Bartnicki. Of course, there are 
situations in which people voluntarily relinquish some of their First 
Amendment rights and are bound by a superseding obligation of 
non-disclosure.264 But if that exception is triggered by ethical duties rather 
than statutory or contractual requirements, it is an arbitrary standard. 
None of this would have mattered if not for the second problem, which 
is that the court’s opinion initially presents the case as lying entirely 
outside of the Bartnicki framework (“we shall assume arguendo,” the 
court wrote, “that Representative McDermott lawfully obtained the tape 
from the Martins”265) but never fully untethered it because it continued to 
tie McDermott’s liability back to the illegal actions of the Martins. Judge 
Griffith’s concurring opinion reflected the same error. He noted, correctly, 
that the “the Court . . . need not reach the Bartnicki issue to resolve the 
matter before us,”266 but concluded that because McDermott’s disclosures 
were not protected by the First Amendment, he had no defense against the 
wiretap claims stemming from the illegal acquisition. 
The court noted that there are many situations in which people are 
prohibited by law, or as a condition of their employment, from disclosing 
sensitive information, and that punishments in those situations do not 
necessarily violate the First Amendment.267 This is true and would have 
been the case if McDermott had been punished by the House of 
Representatives; he might not have had a First Amendment defense 
 
264. Indeed, this was true in at least one other case applying Bartnicki. See Council on Am.-Islamic 
Rels. Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding intern at a private 
organization did not have First Amendment right to disclose organization’s private but newsworthy 
records where doing so violated the parties’ confidentiality agreement); see also Snepp v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (holding that former CIA agent whose employment contract 
prohibited disclosure of classified information, even post-employment, did not have a First 
Amendment right to disclose that information). 
265. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 577. 
266. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring). 
267. The court lists examples of laws that impose limits on disclosure by custodians or possessors 
of certain information, including the Espionage Act, the Privacy Act and the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). And it notes that certain government employees—those 
working for the Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration—are obligated to 
maintain the confidentiality of certain records. Id. None of those examples are on point, however, 
because none involve holding the discloser of those records liable for the antecedent illegal acts of 
third parties. Id. 
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against institutionally imposed sanctions.268 But the fact that he had 
voluntarily surrendered some of his First Amendment rights to disclose 
information placed in his custody is not a reason to tie his culpability back 
to the illegal interception by the Martins. By the D.C. Circuit’s own 
admission, McDermott met all of the conditions of Bartnicki, yet the court 
still found him liable. Whether it intended to or not, then, and despite 
Judge Griffith’s assertions to the contrary, the court carved out a vague 
exception within the Bartnicki framework rather than a clear exception 
to it. 
Unfortunately, other lower court rulings have not offered much 
additional guidance about what constitutes illegal acquisition in the prong 
two sense, although one court held that the receipt of documents that a 
defendant knew were under judicial seal constituted unlawful 
acquisition.269 Prong two scenarios do not arise very often because it is 
rare for statutes to explicitly prohibit the receipt or possession of 
information. Still, courts ought to consider abandoning this criterion 
altogether and strike down as inconsistent with the First Amendment any 
proscription on the mere possession of information, at least where that 
information relates to a matter of public significance, and the possessor 
believed this to be the case prior to taking possession. This would still 
leave open the possibility of liability for those who actively participate in 
the illegal procurement of the information and those who knowingly 
receive illegally acquired information without any expectation that it 
contained information of public concern.270 It would also resolve the 
paradoxical situation where someone is free to publish what they are 
prohibited from possessing, as if the former is possible without the latter. 
There is one final question related to prong two that the courts have not 
resolved and that the Supreme Court has repeatedly left open, including 
in Bartnicki: “[W]hether, in cases where information has been acquired 
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish 
 
268. Compare id., with Baumann v. District of Columbia, 987 F. Supp. 2d 68 (2013) (denying 
Bartnicki protection to government employee disciplined for misconduct after disclosing confidential 
radio communications between emergency response personnel). 
269. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“If . . . Hearst 
obtained the sealed documents in contravention of the sealing order and published them, it has done 
so ‘illegally’ in the sense that it violated a lawful court order of which it had notice.”), superseded, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
270. So, someone offered stolen credit card information or an illegally recorded sex tape would not 
be able to claim the protection, but those with a good faith and well-founded belief that the offered 
information contained material of public significance would be immune from liability for merely 
possessing it.  
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not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”271 
Aside from noting the strong presumption against the constitutionality of 
restraints on publishing newsworthy information,272 the Court offered 
little insight. The question also needs some parsing because a court might 
answer the question differently depending on whether they interpret the 
phrase “unlawful acquisition” to mean primary participation under prong 
one, secondary participation under prong one, or merely the unsolicited 
but illegal receipt or possession of information under prong two. 
The Seventh Circuit purported to enter this “uncharted territory”273 in 
Dahlstrom, noting that the question raised by the Court about restrictions 
on publishing information “acquired unlawfully by a newspaper” was 
“still open.”274 The Seventh Circuit’s answer was incomplete, however, 
because it found that the DPPA was a reasonable limitation on the right to 
publish where there is no “intervening illegal actor” and the “acquirer and 
the publisher are one and the same.”275 The court acknowledged that the 
outcome might have been different if a third party had acquired the 
information illegally and transmitted it to the Sun-Times, but the court 
concluded that was not the case, and so the situation was not analogous to 
Bartnicki.276 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court completely 
ignored the actions of the records custodians at the office of the Secretary 
of State, whose disclosure of the information violated the DPPA. Other 
courts should take note of this factual oversight when interpreting and 
applying Dahlstrom; the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is delegitimized by 
its own mischaracterization of the facts and by its inconsistency with the 
rulings in both Florida Star and Bartnicki. Nevertheless, the Seventh 
Circuit is at least one influential court that has concluded that there is no 
constitutional problem with imposing limits on the publication of 
newsworthy information, at least where the defendant was a primary 
participant in illegally procuring the information. It remains to be seen if 
other courts will concur or whether they will distinguish situations in 
which the defendant was a secondary participant or where they merely 
 
271. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fla. Star v. 
B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989)) (noting that the same question was also reserved by the court in 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978), after being initially raised by 
the Court in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
272. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (emphasis in original) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Pub’g Co., 443 
U.S. 97, 102 (1979)). 
273. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 951–52 (7th Cir. 2015). 
274. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528). 
275. Id. at 952. In those situations, the court noted, punishing disclosure is more likely to deter 
illegal acquisition, unlike in situations like Bartnicki where the publisher of the information was not 
the party who illegally intercepted it. Id. 
276. Id. 
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received the illegally acquired information from a third party. 
There is another approach that courts should consider, which is to sever 
illegal acquisition from publication to more precisely target the harms 
caused by each while not unduly restraining the flow of newsworthy 
information. Courts could simply treat procurement and publication as 
discrete acts redressable through discrete remedies. This is essentially 
what the Fourth Circuit did in a pre-Bartnicki case, Food Lion, Inc. v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.277 In that case, reporters lied to get hired at Food 
Lion grocery stores where they documented unsanitary food handling 
practices while on the job using hidden cameras and microphones.278 The 
resulting broadcast report caused Food Lion stock to plummet, and the 
company sued under a number of tort theories.279 The Fourth Circuit held 
that while the reporters and their parent organization could be held liable 
for torts they committed in their pursuit of the story (e.g., trespass, breach 
of the duty of loyalty), any damages awarded had to be tied directly to the 
harms caused by those breaches, not those resulting from the 
subsequent broadcast.280 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly, its 
rulings in Cohen and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell281 provided the 
doctrinal foundation for Food Lion.282 In addition, the Food Lion principle 
(disentangling newsgathering-related damages from publication-related 
damages283) has been widely embraced by other courts, including by the 
First and Sixth Circuits,284 and it is consistent with other Supreme Court 
 
277. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
278. Id. at 510–11. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 523–24. Food Lion was still free to sue for defamation for any harms caused by the 
broadcast—a claim they never pursued, perhaps because they would not have been able to prove that 
the report was materially false. 
281. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
282. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not 
immunize journalists from liability for torts they commit in their pursuit of news. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
Nevertheless, the Court previously made clear in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell that plaintiffs 
cannot skirt First Amendment requirements by seeking reputation-based damages for 
non-reputation-based torts. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  
283. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (“What Food Lion sought to do, then, was to recover 
defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying the stricter (First 
Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We believe that such an end-run around First 
Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler.”). 
284. Both courts concluded that journalist-defendants were not protected by the First Amendment 
against pecuniary harms caused by their misrepresentations to sources but that damages could not be 
based on the journalists’ subsequent reporting. Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 
2000); W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d 
271 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Not all courts have followed the Food Lion model, however. In two 
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cases decoupling harmful acts from depictions of those acts.285 This 
approach is also compatible with Supreme Court precedent (given that the 
Court has repeatedly reserved the question) and with Bartnicki itself, 
which is often misread as foreclosing First Amendment protection for 
those who unlawfully acquire information when in fact the Court 
approached it from the opposite direction, acknowledging the unchanged 
presence of First Amendment protection when information is “obtained 
lawfully.”286 The Bartnicki Court explicitly refused to identify a ceiling of 
protection, mindful of its longstanding reluctance to offer a final answer 
about “whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with 
the First Amendment.”287 
In the Julian Assange case, untying acquisition and publication would 
mean that the government could still pursue charges under the Espionage 
Act by seeking to prove that Assange conspired with Manning to access 
classified records. They could also pursue separate charges or seek 
injunctions, focusing on the publication of the records. But courts should 
reject the government’s attempts to criminalize the mere possession of 
records that are of public significance or attempts to vitiate First 
Amendment protection for publication by pointing to the technical 
illegality of the defendants’ prior possession or receipt of that information. 
Those approaches, endorsed in one form or another by the courts in 
Quigley, Boehner II and Dahlstrom, and by the plaintiffs in the Cockrum 
and DNC cases, suppose an inextricable connection between illegal actors 
and third-party publishers and turn prong two into a technical exception 
that can too easily be exploited to suppress the circulation of newsworthy 
information. On the latter point, Donald Trump’s threatened tax-records 
lawsuit against The New York Times provides an illustration. The Times 
is clearly protected by Bartnicki because it obtained the records from a 
third party, and the records are clearly newsworthy.288 But a simple 
amendment by Congress outlawing the obtaining of tax records by 
 
California cases, Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., No. CV 03-3554 SJO, 2004 WL 2924590 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) and Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., No. B094245, 1999 WL 
1458129 (Cal. App. Dec. 15, 1999), the courts held that damages for harms caused by non-consensual 
video recordings could be based on both the recording itself and the subsequent broadcast of 
the video. 
285. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (recognizing the legitimacy of laws 
against animal cruelty but striking down application of law that punished depictions of such cruelty). 
For a similar example from a different court and context, see Anderson v. Blake, No. Civ-05-0729-
HE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25654 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2005) (news organization could not be liable 
for intrusion for broadcasting part of a recording of a rape where organization was not involved in 
making the recording).  
286. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001). 
287. Id. at 529. 
288. See Buettner et al., supra note 229. 
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non-custodians would be constitutional under Dahlstrom and would 
subject the Times to criminal liability for publishing information of clear 
public concern. That obstacle also looms large for Assange because the 
Espionage Act proscribes possession of classified documents relating to 
national security.289 
A cleaner and less hazardous approach would be for courts to more 
clearly disentangle procurement, receipt, and publication. They should 
close the Dahlstrom loophole that allows governments to criminalize the 
mere receipt of newsworthy information, particularly when that 
information is supplied by the government itself.290 And courts should 
abandon the Boehner III exception that treats defendants’ duties of 
non-disclosure (even some duties that are not legally enforceable) as 
relevant in assessing liability for illegal procurement. 
C. Bartnicki Prong Three: Public Concern 
The third prerequisite for invoking Bartnicki protection is that 
information addresses a matter of “public concern.”291 This is a familiar 
but malleable term used by the courts in a number of contexts and 
sometimes expressed as “public interest,” “public issue,” “public 
significance,” or “newsworthiness.” The Supreme Court has long 
recognized292 the distinction between private people and issues, on one 
hand, and public people and issues on the other, giving more expansive 
protection to speech about the latter in the adjudication of defamation 
claims,293 in assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on 
public-employee speech,294 and in the pre-Bartnicki line of cases 
involving the disclosure of non-public information.295 
 
289. See supra note 259.  
290. As Justice Stewart noted in Pentagon Papers, “[t]he responsibility must be where the power 
is.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 729–30 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
291. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525. 
292. The First Amendment “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all 
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940). 
293. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (permitting states to establish 
less onerous standards of proof in libel cases brought by private people than those applying to public 
people); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (extending protection “to all 
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern”); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964) (recognizing the “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
294. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that public employee could be fired 
without violating the First Amendment where the triggering speech involved private, internal 
workplace issues, not “a matter of public concern”). 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
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Prior to Bartnicki, lower courts had not given much shape to the 
concept of public concern but had embraced expansive conceptions of 
“newsworthiness,” finding that it encompassed just about everything short 
of “morbid and sensational prying into private lives.”296 The Supreme 
Court, which has not defined newsworthiness, offered a seemingly 
narrower definition of public concern in Connick v. Myers,297 saying that 
whether speech addresses matters of public concern must be determined 
by its “content, form, and context”298 but that it generally encompasses 
material “relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community.”299 A few years after Bartnicki, the Court added in City of 
San Diego v. Roe300 that “public concern is something that is a subject of 
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 
and concern to the public.”301 In 2011, the Court broached the definitional 
question again in Snyder v. Phelps302 but largely reiterated the language 
from Connick and Roe.303 
The Supreme Court did not address these definitional questions in 
Bartnicki, but it is clear that Justice Stevens had in mind an expansive 
notion of public concern. His opinion only mentioned disclosures of 
“trade secrets, domestic gossip or other information of purely private 
concern”304 as being potentially305 unprotected. He also at one point used 
the term “newsworthy” in conjunction with “public concern,” stating that 
the content of the Kane-Bartnicki call involved matters of public concern, 
and if the conversation had occurred in public, it would have been 
considered newsworthy.306 Perhaps most important was Stevens’s 
characterization of the salient facts in Bartnicki. Stevens focused on the 
newsworthiness of the broader context of the call—the battle between the 
 
296. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652F (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)). Newsworthiness is a defense to civil 
claims for public disclosure of private facts and has been defined so broadly in that context that one 
media law scholar suggested that the defense had “swallow[ed]” the tort. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy 
in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966). 
297. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
298. Id. at 147. 
299. Id. at 146. 
300. 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
301. Id. at 83–84. 
302. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
303. Id. at 453. 
304. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
305. Stevens did not rule out protection for speech on those subjects but merely reserved the 
question. Id. Some courts have acknowledged this uncertainty, e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 
1044, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 2003), but none has recognized protection for private information in 
Bartnicki situations. 
306. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525. 
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union and the school district—which he described in the final paragraph 
of his opinion as “unquestionably a matter of public concern,” adding that 
“respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.”307 
Stevens put no emphasis on Kane’s “blow off their front 
porches” comment.308 
Breyer, on the other hand, began his opinion by highlighting the 
porches comment, which he clearly viewed as more than rhetorical 
hyperbole, writing that the “threat of potential physical harm to others” 
made the recording a matter of “unusual public concern.” 309 Because 
Breyer’s concurrence emphasized the threat rather than the broader 
subject-matter of the conversation,310 and because he and Justice 
O’Connor provided the crucial votes for the defendants,311 lower courts 
were left with some uncertainty about where to place the emphasis under 
prong three. 
In terms of terminology, lower courts applying Bartnicki have mirrored 
the Court’s treatment of “public concern,” “public interest,” and 
“newsworthiness” as synonymous or parallel concepts and often use them 
interchangeably within the same opinion. Some courts have explored the 
definitional issues in more detail,312 some have avoided the issue 
altogether,313 and others have treated either the public314 or private315 
nature of the information as self-evident. The types of material that courts 
applying Bartnicki have found to be of public concern include video of 
police executing a search warrant at a private residence,316 details of an 
 
307. Id. at 535. 
308. Stevens mentions Kane’s comment, but as part of the facts of the case, not as a determinative 
factor in assessing the newsworthiness of the call. Id. at 518–19. 
309. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
310. Breyer also highlighted the public-figure status of the participants. Id. at 539. 
311. Justice O’Connor joined the Breyer concurrence, creating a six-vote majority in favor of 
the defendants. 
312. See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 658–59 (E.D. Va. 
2019); Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572–73 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
313. Neither the district court in Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2004) nor 
the D.C. Circuit in Boehner II or Boehner III addressed the issue of public concern. Indeed, in Boehner 
II the court only acknowledged prong three of Bartnicki in a footnote and then noted that the Supreme 
Court had previously warned about the difficulty of judges determining what issues are of public 
concern. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1014 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)). 
314. See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC v. State, 183 So. 3d 480, 482–83 (2016) (declaring 
that information about prosecutors’ collaboration with a jailhouse “snitch” was “clearly one of 
public concern”). 
315. See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting applicability 
of Bartnicki to disclosure of private credit report information). 
316. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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illegal blackmail scheme,317 information about evidence in an upcoming 
murder trial,318 and information relating to the validity of a police 
lineup.319 Information that courts have found to not be of public concern 
include false speech,320 defamatory speech,321 non-consensual sexual 
images (“revenge porn”),322 information about the paternity of a child 
accessed from a private cell phone,323 and cell phone conversations in 
which a participant made a threat of violence that the court ultimately 
viewed as not credible.324 
A few courts added their own peculiar conditions. In Quigley, the Tenth 
Circuit distinguished Bartnicki in part because the Aronsons’ lawyers “did 
not accurately portray the contents of the Quigleys’ recorded telephone 
conversations.”325 False information is not newsworthy, of course, but the 
court did not offer any insight about the point at which these reporting 
errors might destroy Bartnicki protection. 
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the defendants could 
not rely on Bartnicki because they were not “members of the press” and 
because they distributed illegally recorded video as an extra feature on a 
commercially distributed DVD.326 The court in Bowens made no effort to 
 
317. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
318. Palm Beach, 183 So. 3d 480.  
319. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015). 
320. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003). 
321. State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. 
322. State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d 791. 
323. In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. 2015). The defendant 
husband discovered text messages on the phone of his plaintiff wife indicating that she had received 
fertility treatments, leading the husband to suspect he might not be the father of their child. The court 
noted that the defendant had “not identified any public concern in [his wife’s] text messages and other 
information that he surreptitiously took from her phones,” and that the information was of “purely 
private concern” and therefore outside the scope of Bartnicki. Id. at 1428 (quoting Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001)). 
324. Wingrave v. Hebert, 2006-1240 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/9/07); 964 So. 2d 385. Although the court 
expressed doubt about the credibility of the threat made by an intoxicated participant in a private 
phone conversation, it treated this as a material question of fact to be assessed by the lower court on 
remand. Id. at 11–13, 964 So. 2d at 392–93. 
325. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067 (10th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). In Bartnicki, 
the court noted: 
[T]he defendants broadcast the recorded conversation and printed a transcript of the 
conversation. Here, in contrast, the defendants merely used snippets of the Quigleys’ 
conversations in preparing the Aronsons’ civil complaint, and inaccurately portrayed those 
comments as demonstrating the existence of an anti-Semitic campaign on the part of the Quigleys 
against the Aronsons.  
Id. 
326. Bowens v. Ary, Inc., No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *21 (Mich. Ct. App. 
 
Ugland & Mazzeo (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021  11:58 AM 
2021] HACKS, LEAKS, AND DATA DUMPS 189 
 
explain whom it considered to be “members of the press,”327 what works 
fit within its exclusion of material distributed “for profit,”328 or how either 
of these things affected the public’s interest in the material. 329 It proved 
to be an aberrational case, however. No other court has conditioned 
protection on the defendants’ journalistic credentials330 or on their 
commercial interests in disclosure. 
Another anomalous case was DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner,331 in 
which the California Supreme Court held that the online distribution of 
DVD decryption software did not relate to matters of public concern. This 
type of functional speech does not contribute to the examination of public 
issues, the court held, and furthermore it fit within the Bartnicki Court’s 
implicit prong-three exception for trade secrets.332 This issue reemerged 
more recently in DNC. The DNC alleged that the defendants violated the 
DNC’s trade secrets by publishing its donor lists and fundraising 
strategies.333 Judge Koeltl concluded that Bartnicki protection could not 
be vanquished by simply labeling something a trade secret, and that the 
 
Sept. 24, 2009), rev’d in part, 489 Mich. 851 (2011). The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately 
dismissed the wiretap claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not have reasonable expectations of privacy 
in the bustling backstage area of an arena. It did not address the Bartnicki criteria because it found no 
basis for the claim in the first place. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. One court suggested that media attention is an indicator of public concern. Wingrave, 
2006-1240 at 11–13, 964 So. 2d at 391–92 (“However, we find Bartnicki distinguishable [because] 
the record reflects that [the] telephone conversation was not regarding information reported in the 
media.”). 
329. Indeed, this case is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s notation in Bartnicki that the Court 
drew “no distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
525 n.8 (2001).  
330. For the most part, courts did not address the status or credentials of the defendants and treated 
their baseline eligibility for Bartnicki protection as obvious or just addressed it in passing. See, e.g., 
Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he 
First Amendment prevents such liability in the same way it would preclude liability for press outlets 
that publish materials of public interest . . . .” (emphasis added)). Judge Sentelle emphasized the 
inconsequence of journalistic identity in Boehner II. 441 F.3d 1010, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, 
J., dissenting) (“Lest someone draw a distinction between the First Amendment rights of the press 
and the First Amendment speech rights of nonprofessional communicators, I would note that one of 
the communicators in Bartnicki was himself a news commentator, and the Supreme Court placed no 
reliance on that fact.”). 
331. 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003). 
332. Id. at 86 (noting that the Court need not decide whether to protect “disclosures of trade secrets 
or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern” (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533)). One federal district court applying Bartnicki emphasized that “trade 
secrets and commercial information” often needs to be treated with special sensitivity and can 
justifiably be withheld from public records. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 424 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). That part of the decision was addressed to the appropriateness of a court seal, 
however, not specifically to the issue of public concern under Bartnicki. 
333. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 436. 
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information the DNC sought to shield involved matters of “paramount 
public concern.”334 Whatever interest the DNC had in secrecy was 
“dwarfed by the news-worthiness of the documents as [a] whole.”335 
The Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom took a perplexing approach to the 
public concern issue and, in turn, left another mess for future courts. The 
court conceded that the Sun-Times investigation examining the propriety 
of a police line-up involving the Mayor’s nephew was a matter of public 
concern,336 but concluded that the information the reporters obtained from 
motor vehicle records was largely duplicative of information the reporters 
had legally obtained from other sources and was therefore “of less 
pressing public concern than the [information] in Bartnicki.”337 This 
ignores the phrasing of Justice Stevens’s opinion, which focused on the 
“subject matter of the conversation”338—not particular details—as the 
basis for gauging the public interest. Also, as the court points out, the 
material obtained from the records—the height, weight, hair color, and 
eye color of the officers who participated in the lineup—were readily 
observable. This does more to undermine the legitimacy of the 
government’s concealment of these records than to refute the utility of the 
information for the reporters. (Under the Seventh Circuit’s logic, the 
government could criminalize the disclosure of a government record 
indicating that the sun is yellow.) Even if the DPAA records were less 
essential than the information at issue in Bartnicki, it still clearly related 
to a matter of public interest. Meanwhile, as the court effectively 
acknowledges, there is no basis for treating the officers’ conspicuous 
physical characteristics as private. 
Courts should fix this by simply striking down as unconstitutional any 
legislative or administrative provision that criminalizes the possession of, 
or otherwise suppresses, information that is plainly observable and ipso 
facto not private. Indeed, one federal district court in 2003, citing 
Bartnicki, did just that, suggesting that this type of information is not 
constitutionally concealable in the first place339—something the Seventh 
 
334. Id. at 437. 
335. Id. Judge Koeltl concluded that the publication of this information “allowed the American 
electorate to look behind the curtain of one of the two major political parties in the United States 
during a presidential election.” Id. 
336. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015). 
337. Id. 
338. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001). 
339. In Sheehan v. Gregoire, the court struck down parts of a state statute that criminalized the 
unauthorized publication of “personal identifying information”—including residential addresses, 
phone numbers and birth dates. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003). “Defendants cite no 
authority,” the court held, “for the proposition that truthful lawfully-obtained, publicly-available 
personal identifying information constitutes a mode of constitutionally proscribable speech.” Id.  
Ugland & Mazzeo (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021  11:58 AM 
2021] HACKS, LEAKS, AND DATA DUMPS 191 
 
Circuit seems not to have considered.340 
Many of the courts applying Bartnicki, no doubt wary of making 
categorical pronouncements, have focused on the facts of the cases before 
them and the ways in which those facts might be distinguishable from or 
analogized to the facts of Bartnicki. Unfortunately, some courts have 
seized on the most sensational aspect of Bartnicki—Kane’s “blow off 
their front porches” comment341—using that as the benchmark for “public 
concern,” effectively narrowing Bartnicki’s scope. Although some courts, 
like the First Circuit in Jean, focused its attention on Stevens’s opinion 
and pointed to the collective bargaining negotiations in Bartnicki as the 
basis for finding the Kane-Bartnicki phone call to be a matter of public 
concern,342 other courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom, largely 
ignored Stevens’s opinion and instead cited Breyer’s concurring opinion, 
concluding that the material at issue in Dahlstrom was “of less pressing 
public concern than the threats of physical violence in Bartnicki.”343 
Even for judges who emphasize Breyer’s concurrence, it is a 
misreading of Bartnicki to conclude that threats of violence are a 
minimum threshold for establishing that an issue is of public concern. The 
analogy only works in one direction. It is certainly fair to conclude that 
information that is at least as consequential as the “porches” threat would 
clearly be of public concern and would satisfy the four justices signing 
Stevens’s opinion and the two who signed Breyer’s concurrence. It would 
not be fair to take from Bartnicki, however, that anything falling below 
that standard is not of public concern. Breyer was not marking outer 
boundaries but merely acknowledging the unusual circumstances of the 
case.344 Although he warned that Stevens’s opinion should not be read as 
establishing an all-encompassing public interest exception to privacy 
laws,345 courts should not read Breyer’s concurrence as rejecting the 
legitimacy of the public’s interest in anything less consequential than what 
 
340. Relatedly, courts should not accept the designation of a record as “private” without 
considering its actual content. The DPAA records obtained in Dahlstrom were only private in the 
categorical sense. Similarly, in the dispute between ESPN’s Adam Schefter and NFL player Jason 
Pierre-Paul, Schefter clearly disclosed a record that had been categorized as private. But the facts 
revealed—that Pierre-Paul had part of his hand amputated—were not truly private; his hand was 
plainly observable and so his injury would never remain a secret. 
341. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519. 
342. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that the “warrantless 
and potentially unlawful search of a private residence” at issue was at least as worthy of public 
scrutiny as the union battle in Bartnicki). 
343. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) 
(citing Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring)) (“noting that the intercepted conversation 
presented a ‘matter of unusual public concern’”). 
344. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
345. Id. 
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Breyer perceived to be an immediate and credible threat of violence. 
Nevertheless, this divide persists and is evidenced by the approaches 
of the two federal district courts in the DNC hacking cases. In DNC, Judge 
Koeltl concluded that, collectively, the hacked emails addressed matters 
of public concern because they shed light on the behind-the-scenes 
operations of a major-party presidential campaign.346 In Cockrum, 
however, Judge Hudson held that Bartnicki is “distinguishable from the 
immediate case” in part because “the information at issue in Bartnicki 
pertained to a contemplated act of violence clearly a matter of public 
concern”347 and that the evidence in Cockrum was insufficient to 
demonstrate a similarly weighty interest in the DNC emails.348 
This division among judges about whether “public concern” should be 
calculated in an atomized way, looking at the newsworthiness of 
particular pieces of information, or in a more holistic way, focusing on the 
broader context of the full communication, is unresolved but particularly 
salient is some of the newer cases, especially those involving large caches 
of data. In Cockrum, Judge Hudson seemed generally persuaded by the 
plaintiffs’ argument that “the First Amendment does not protect 
[publication of] large amounts of private information with some isolated 
facts of public concern,”349 while in DNC, Judge Koeltl expressed 
apprehension about the opposite problem—singling out small pieces of 
private information to trump “the newsworthiness of the documents as [a] 
whole.”350 This is clearly an issue that courts need to resolve and one that 
is particularly complicated in cases involving classified records, like those 
at the center of the Assange prosecution, where the classification is itself 
a simultaneous marker of both the sensitivity and newsworthiness of 
the information. 
Going forward, courts should embrace Stevens’s contextual approach 
to assessing the public interest in communication, at least when applying 
Bartnicki itself.351 Where published information includes some 
particularly invasive revelations, aggrieved plaintiffs can still file separate 
civil claims targeting that published content, subject to the normal 
 
346. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  
347. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 657 (E.D. Va. 2019); 
see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. F.W., 986 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Mass. 2013) (“Here, we are not 
concerned with a public threat . . . .”).  
348. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 658–59. Judge Hudson ultimately concluded that the release of 
the hacked emails did “not warrant First Amendment protection.” Id. at 659. 
349. Id. at 658. 
350. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 437. 
351. It is likely Justice Breyer was not marking a minimum threshold for protection but simply 
highlighting the most striking aspect of the Kane-Bartnicki phone call, probably as a way of 
simplifying the decision. In any case, there is no reason courts should assume more than that. 
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exceptions and defenses that apply to those torts. In Bartnicki scenarios, 
the question is essentially whether courts should circumscribe a 
publisher’s freedoms because of an antecedent violation by someone 
else—to link one actor to another. The indirectness of this, coupled with 
what should be a strong First Amendment presumption in favor of 
disclosing truthful, newsworthy information, augurs for a more capacious 
understanding of public concern under prong three. In a subsequent, 
publication-focused action, however—non-Bartnicki actions, so to 
speak—where the attention is on the harm caused by the content itself 
without regard to its provenance, a more targeted conception of public 
concern might be easier to justify. In hacking or other scenarios in which 
large databases or batches of illegally acquired information are involved, 
recipients of that data should be able to publish it without facing liability 
for the interception, provided the information collectively sheds light on 
matters of public concern. However, publishers could still be liable, in a 
subsequent action for, say, public disclosure of private facts, for discrete 
revelations contained within the aggregate data.352 A better approach, 
described more fully in the next section, would be to repeal or modify 
Bartnicki to fully disentangle illegal acquisition and 
subsequent publication. 
IV. REPAIRING BARTNICKI: THE PATH FORWARD 
The Court in Bartnicki had an opportunity to resolve the case by 
leaning on its prior rulings and recognizing, as the Sixth Circuit did in a 
pre-Bartnicki case, that “[n]o matter how inappropriate the 
acquisition . . . the right to disseminate [newsworthy] information is what 
the Constitution intended to protect.”353 Remedies existed then, and are 
available today, to punish those who violate the law to procure 
information and those whose publications cause harm. The Court 
complicated matters by forging an unnecessary link between the two. 
Breaking that link and decoupling procurement and publication would be 
the most helpful next step. It would simplify matters both practically and 
conceptually and would align the law with pre-Bartnicki precedent. 
 
352. The normal defense of newsworthiness would certainly apply to these claims, although courts 
should recognize that plaintiffs’ privacy interests are lower with workplace, and particularly 
government, communications, and that, as a practical matter, there are times in which a private piece 
of information is not readily severable from the newsworthy whole. See, e.g., McNamara v. Freedom 
Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a newspaper photographer’s 
photo of a boy playing in a public soccer match was protected and newsworthy, despite the photo 
inadvertently capturing the boys exposed genitals). 
353. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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A. Reverse and Replace 
Bartnicki was a necessary decision in that it addressed a question the 
Court had left open almost exactly thirty years earlier in Pentagon Papers: 
to what extent can those who knowingly receive newsworthy information, 
illegally acquired or leaked by someone else, be subject to 
post-publication liability without violating the First Amendment? The 
Court’s answer to that question in Bartnicki was needlessly convoluted, 
however. The Court should have simply affirmed the principle from Daily 
Mail—when one “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of 
the highest order”354—and added that one does not unlawfully acquire 
newsworthy information by requesting it or merely coming into 
possession of it. Courts could express this even more affirmatively: 
imposing civil or criminal penalties on those who request or possess 
newsworthy information violates the First Amendment. This approach 
preserves the free speech interests while disentangling the harms caused 
by illegal procurement from harms caused by publication, bringing things 
into alignment with the Food Lion principle.355 
Decoupling procurement and publication would still allow those who 
participate in illegal activity, as first links in the chain, to be criminally 
charged, and it would leave open other remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs. 
A person whose communications were illegally intercepted could still sue 
the interceptor for intrusion or bring a suit under the wiretap laws. 
Plaintiffs could also sue separately for disclosures of their private 
communications under traditional tort theories, where applicable.356 Of 
course, decoupling would make deterrence more challenging. The wiretap 
laws at issue in Bartnicki punished the “use” and “disclosure” of 
confidential communications in part to cut off incentives for 
interception,357 and there is a risk that future hackers will be emboldened 
by knowing that others have some latitude to publish the fruits of their 
interceptions. But legislators can always augment penalties or bolster 
 
354. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). 
355. See supra text accompanying note 283. 
356. For example, if a defendant mischaracterized or selectively edited the intercepted 
communications in a way that left a false and defamatory impression of the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
might be able to sustain a libel claim. If the disclosures involved deeply personal information the 
revelation of which would be considered highly offensive, the plaintiff might be able to succeed on a 
claim for public disclosure of private facts, although the defendant could defeat this claim by showing 
that the information was newsworthy. See supra text accompany notes 277–280.  
357. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d)–(e). 
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enforcement, as Justice Stevens noted in Bartnicki.358 Even in situations 
in which a hacker is never identified or where the hacker is a foreign actor 
unreachable by a civil suit, plaintiffs would still have recourse to sue for 
content-related harms, as they do now. So, in situations like the 2014 hack 
of Sony Pictures, which involved some of the company’s unreleased films 
and developmental scripts,359 the company could sue those who shared its 
copyrighted content online even without knowing the identity of the 
original hackers. In situations like the 2010 dispute between Apple and 
Gizmodo over Gizmodo’s reporting about an unreleased iPhone 
prototype, Apple could at least theoretically sue Gizmodo and others for 
publishing its trade secrets.360 And in situations like Bollea v. Gawker 
Media, LLC361 or the 2014 iCloud hack exposing nude images of female 
celebrities,362 plaintiffs still have recourse in privacy law irrespective of 
the means by which the information was originally accessed. In all of 
these cases, downstream re-publishers could be similarly liable, so there 
are substantial guardrails in place without having to condition a 
defendant’s right to publish on the purity with which the information was 
originally procured. 
Decoupling procurement and publication would affect the public 
concern element as well. The newsworthiness of information would 
continue to be irrelevant to criminal or civil actions targeting illegal 
procurement, and in publication-focused suits, defendants could still 
protect themselves in most cases by demonstrating the newsworthiness of 
the information. 
But defendants would not have to demonstrate the newsworthiness of 
information in order to avoid liability for crimes or torts relating to the 
initial illegal procurement. There are many situations, especially in 
hacking cases, where information is acquired that is not sensitive enough 
to support a civil claim based on its publication but is also not plainly 
 
358. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (“The normal method of deterring unlawful 
conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it,” and penalties for 
violations can always “be made more severe.”). 
359. See generally A Breakdown and Analysis of the December, 2014 Sony Hack, RISK BASED SEC. 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/05/a-breakdown-and-analysis-of-the-
december-2014-sony-hack/ [https://perma.cc/LEL2-MPJM]. 
360. See generally Tim Wu, Don’t Prosecute Gizmodo for the iPhone that Walked into a Bar, 
SLATE (Apr. 28, 2010, 4:04 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2010/04/don-t-prosecute-gizmodo-
for-the-lost-4g-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/CZ54-VPLC]. In that case, Gizmodo obtained an 
unreleased iPhone that someone found at a bar and then provided to Gizmodo. Id. Apple pursued 
criminal charges against Gizmodo but could plausibly have sued for violation of its trade secrets.  
361. No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016). 
362. See generally Charles Arthur, Naked Celebrity Hack: Security Experts Focus on iCloud 
Backup Theory, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep
/01/naked-celebrity-hack-icloud-backup-jennifer-lawrence [https://perma.cc/2LN2-KQWX]. 
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newsworthy. Separating procurement and publication claims would put 
the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that published information has 
caused some actionable harm instead of putting the burden on the 
defendant to demonstrate the newsworthiness of the information. Under 
Bartnicki, defendants like the Trump Campaign and WikiLeaks can be 
held liable for publishing banal email correspondence, even without 
evidence that it caused harm. Although Justice Stevens’s opinion did not 
foreclose the possibility of Bartnicki protection for the publication of 
information not addressing matters of public concern—he reserved that 
question363—no lower court has extended Bartnicki that far, so this risk 
remains. Indeed, in Cockrum, Judge Hudson did not refute the plaintiff’s 
assertion that, as a matter of law, defendants claiming Bartnicki protection 
must demonstrate that every disclosed fact relates to a matter of legitimate 
public concern.364 
It might be too much to expect the Court to abandon Bartnicki and 
pursue this decoupling approach, particularly given the changes in the 
makeup of the Court.365 But short of that, there are interpretive 
modifications and clarifications the Supreme Court and lower courts 
could make to the Bartnicki framework to help address the problems and 
circuit splits that have emerged over the past twenty years. 
B. Aiding and Abetting as a New Prong One Standard 
One of the most strongly rooted aspects of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence is its rejection of the notion that journalists (or 
those serving journalistic functions) should be offered special 
dispensation from criminal sanctions or civil lawsuits targeting their 
newsgathering behavior.366 Prong one of the Bartnicki test will therefore 
endure, at least to the extent that it denies a legal shield to those who 
violate the law by stealing or intercepting information and to those who 
leak information that they were legally obligated to conceal. No courts 
 
363. Stevens wrote that the Court did not need to decide whether the government’s interest in 
deterring interceptions was strong enough to justify the application of the wiretap law to “disclosures 
of . . . purely private concern,” because in Bartnicki the law’s enforcement implicated “the core 
purposes of the First Amendment [by imposing] sanctions on the publication of truthful information 
of public concern.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533–34. 
364. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 658 (E.D. Va. 2019). 
365. Since Bartnicki was decided, Justices Souter, Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg have been 
replaced by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett, respectively. Concurring Justice 
O’Connor has been replaced by Justice Alito. Dissenting Justices Rehnquist and Scalia have been 
replaced by Justices Roberts and Gorsuch, respectively. Concurring Justice Breyer, and dissenting 
Justice Thomas, remain on the Court. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/P7HD-M5YS]. 
366. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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will provide sanctuary to those who are primary participants in the illegal 
procurement of information, nor to their co-conspirators.367 The courts are 
deeply divided, however, about the extent to which secondary participants 
are eligible for Bartnicki protection. Justice Stevens did not offer much 
detail, but Justice Breyer’s contingencies provided a script for judges to 
impose any number of limitations.368 
In demarcating this boundary, courts should be mindful of the strong 
presumption in favor of free speech and press protection when weighed 
against most other social interests, including personal privacy, as the 
Court acknowledged.369 They should favor clear lines that minimize ad 
hoc analyses by judges. And, not incidentally, they should recognize the 
urgent need for robust journalistic and public scrutiny of powerful 
institutions in light of the spread of authoritarianism, increasing 
institutional opacity, withering free-press protections,370 and the fact that 
new technologies, rather than serving as antidotes to concentrated power, 
are increasingly exploited by corporations371 and governments372 to 
enlarge their influence over consumers and citizens. With all of this in 
mind, a reasonable approach would be to extend Bartnicki protection to 
secondary participants except where they actively collaborate with 
primary participants in a way that is akin to the crime of aiding and 
abetting.373 Aiding and abetting charges typically apply to those who 
actively and knowingly assist someone in the commission of a crime.374 
Focusing on these criteria would mean that someone would not lose 
Bartnicki protection merely because they knew the information was 
 
367. See, e.g., Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, No. 19-cv-0150 (DLF), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58302, at *63 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (rejecting defendant’s First Amendment defense against a 
computer hacking claim because he was not merely the publisher of the hacked information but was 
also “‘alleged to have conspired with’ the hackers and to have taken part in a scheme to disseminate 
the knowingly hacked information to the media”). 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96. 
369. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (noting that generally “privacy concerns give 
way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance”). 
370. See supra notes 17–19. 
371. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (1st ed. 2019). 
372. See generally Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz & Joseph Wright, The Digital Dictators: 
How Technology Strengthens Autocracy, FOREIGN AFFS. (Mar./Apr. 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-06/digital-dictators [https://perma.cc/88YZ-
B83P]. 
373. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (authorizing criminal penalties for anyone who “aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a crime). Under the proposal suggested 
in this Article, publication would not constitute abetting, and “counsels” would mean providing 
material or technical assistance in the procurement of the information, not merely “encouraging,” the 
leaking of information by the source.  
374. Aiding and Abetting, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoate-
crimes/aiding-abetting/ [https://perma.cc/P7JH-WXPA]. 
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illegally acquired by a source or where there was direct communication 
between the source and publisher subsequent to the illegal acquisition by 
the source. This would simplify matters and resolve the circuit split 
between the Tenth Circuit (Quigley) and the Third Circuit (Jean) and fix 
some of the uncertainty left by the D.C. Circuit’s Boehner rulings. 
Applying this rule would offer protection to defendants like The New York 
Times, which received some of Donald Trump’s tax returns likely with 
full knowledge that they had been illegally leaked, and probably after 
having communicated in some fashion with their source or sources.375 
One caveat in this context is that it is crucial that courts not treat 
information as property, at least where it involves matters of public 
concern. Although aiding and abetting or illegal possession charges can 
be brought against those who knowingly receive stolen personal property, 
the same should not apply to information. There is no public interest 
served by the illegal possession of stolen personal property.376 At the same 
time, Bartnicki protection could reasonably be denied to someone who 
knowingly received stolen information that they knew did not involve 
matters of public concern and that they knew it was illegal to accept. So, 
defendants who receive from sources things like stolen credit card 
numbers or the passwords to protected computer systems could not invoke 
Bartnicki merely because those exchanges involved information rather 
than tangible property.377 
Courts should also extend protection to those who request information 
that has already been stolen by a source. This would support the ruling by 
Judge Koeltl in DNC, in which he held WikiLeaks could not be held liable 
for requesting information that it knew had been illegally hacked by 
Russian operatives,378 and it would resolve the apparent split between 
Judge Koeltl and Judge Hudson in the two DNC hacking cases.379 Courts 
should take this one step further, however, to make clear that even 
before-the-fact requests or pleas for information should be protected, 
provided there is no inducement or coercion by the requester of the source, 
nor any implicit quid pro quo. It is normal for reporters to ask for 
information, and, as one court noted, “the First Amendment protects the 
 
375. See supra text accompanying note 229.  
376. This is why the analogy Judge Randolph used in Boehner II—that one can be criminally liable 
for knowingly accepting a stolen ring—is inapt. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
see also supra text accompanying note 164. 
377. Of course, this would be different in cases where the defendant had a good faith belief that the 
information being offered addressed matters of public concern, even if, after receiving the 
information, this turned out not to be the case.  
378. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d. 410, 435–36 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
379. Id.; Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019). 
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ordinary news gathering techniques of reporters and those techniques 
cannot be stripped of their constitutional shield by calling them 
tortious.”380 Of course, sources often break the law by leaking non-public 
records. But to impute that liability to the requester of those records, 
without any evidence of coercion or inducement, would violate the First 
Amendment. This might represent an outer-limit interpretation of 
Bartnicki, and no court has yet charted this boundary, but it would create 
a clearer and more speech- and press-protective standard for linking 
primary and secondary participants. In ordinary contexts not involving 
news and information, people can be charged with the crime of solicitation 
when they influence others to act unlawfully.381 But this typically applies 
in felony cases where one “command[s], forc[es], or induc[es]” someone 
to commit a crime.382 A simple request or plea for someone to access or 
leak information in violation of the law should not be sufficient to attach 
legal liability to the requester, at least where the information sought is 
about a matter of public concern.383 
When Donald Trump was campaigning against Hillary Clinton in 2016, 
he publicly urged Russia to engage in computer crimes to locate the 
thousands of emails Clinton deleted after leaving her job as Secretary of 
State.384 “Russia, if you’re listening,” Trump said, “I hope you’re able to 
find the 30,000 emails that are missing.”385 That same day, coincidentally 
or not, Russian operatives made their first attempts to hack Clinton’s 
servers.386 Whatever the ethical propriety of Trump’s plea, it should not 
be treated as a solicitation of crime because he was too far removed from 
the illegal actors, and the information he sought was of public concern. 
The same should apply to someone like Nicholas Kristof of The New York 
Times who urged IRS officials—via a tweet—to leak Trump’s tax records 
to him.387 Even if Kristof’s tweet was a technical breach of the law, as 
 
380. Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 59–60 (Ct. App. 1986). 
381. Solicitation, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoate-crimes/solicitation/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7ZA-LLXA]. 
382. Id. 
383. Courts might draw a distinction, for example, between soliciting someone to leak information 
about clandestine government surveillance of U.S. citizens and soliciting someone to expose the 
identities of undercover CIA agents. 
384. Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Invited the Russians to Hack Clinton. Were They Listening?, N.Y. 




387. See Kristof, supra note 20. 
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some have suggested,388 it should be protected by the First Amendment. 
Kristof was not in a position to influence IRS officials, he had no direct 
contact with them, and the information he sought was plainly newsworthy. 
Parts of the indictment of Julian Assange target a similarly general 
exhortation—specifically WikiLeaks’s promulgation on its website of a 
“Most Wanted Leaks” list.389 However scandalous one might find this 
kind of communication, it is even less specific than Trump’s plea to the 
Russians, and in neither case should Bartnicki protection be denied on the 
basis of such indirect communication. 
It is a closer call with regard to Assange’s interactions with Chelsea 
Manning. Assange was in direct and ongoing communication with 
Manning and made specific and repeated requests for information. 
Nevertheless, those things alone should not be treated as sufficient to tie 
the two together criminally or to negate Bartnicki protection. Manning 
was not beholden to Assange or threatened by him, and Assange did not 
offer any reward.390 Manning was always in control and had the 
unencumbered discretion to act or not act. This is a crucial principle to 
recognize because it arises daily in the context of leaks. Courts need to 
assert once and for all that a reporter neither commits a crime nor loses 
First Amendment protection by merely asking a source to leak classified 
information—again, assuming it involves a matter of public concern. The 
same should apply to those who encourage such disclosures, at least 
where there is no coercion, inducement, or quid pro quo. Assange’s 
prosecutors, perhaps inspired by Breyer’s concurrence,391 rest much of 
their indictment on the fact that Assange encouraged Manning’s leaks,392 
and some media lawyers have suggested that this might be enough to 
 
388. Eugene Volokh, Is Asking IRS Agents to Leak President Trump’s Tax Return a Crime (and 




389. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 5. The indictment alleges that Chelsea 
Manning’s first disclosures of classified documents were in direct response to the WikiLeaks “Most 
Wanted Hacks” appeal. Id. at 5–6. 
390. This refers to a before-the-fact payment, which could serve to induce the illegal actions of the 
source. After-the-fact payments, if they were never discussed prior to the exchange of information 
between the publisher and the source, would not negate Bartnicki protection. See Allen v. Beirich, 
No. CCB-18-3781, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197183 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2019). 
391. Breyer implies in Bartnicki that a different result might be warranted in cases where a 
defendant encouraged a source to illegally disclose information. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
538 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
392. See supra text accompanying note 232. 
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negate Assange’s possible First Amendment defense.393 But 
encouragement is just a more emphatic species of “request” and creates 
an amorphous threshold for criminal liability—one that is not suitable for 
situations where substantial First Amendment interests are involved. 
Where Assange potentially crossed the line, however, was in providing 
particularized technical assistance to Manning. First Amendment 
protection should not be denied to one who merely discusses with a source 
the virtues of disclosing classified information. Nor should someone be 
legally vulnerable for urging a source to illegally disclose information. 
Courts might reasonably draw a distinction, however, between those 
situations and ones in which the requester engaged in strategic 
coordination394 with a source and shared expertise to facilitate the actual 
execution of the illegal acts. So, much of what prosecutors emphasize in 
the Assange indictment—Assange’s general calls for hacks and leaks,395 
his encouragement of Manning,396 and his exchanges with Manning about 
the most potentially fruitful databases to mine397—should not be treated 
as consequential to Assange’s expected First Amendment defense. To the 
extent that prosecutors can demonstrate that Assange aided and abetted 
Manning by providing technical assistance, however, courts could treat 
Assange as a primary participant, akin to the defendant in Peavy, whose 
case Justice Stevens distinguished at the outset of his Bartnicki opinion.398 
It is not clear, to be sure, that prosecutors will be able to prove that 
Assange provided such assistance and that it was instrumental to 
Manning’s illegal actions,399 but this is the only basis upon which the court 
should consider denying Bartnicki protection to Assange under prong one. 
In order to bring clarity to Bartnicki, lower courts should begin to 
extend protection under prong one to all defendants who were not primary 
 
393. See Floyd Abrams, What Facts Would Deny the Trump Campaign First Amendment 
Protections in Colluding with Russia, JUST SEC. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
60995/facts-deny-trump-campaign-amendment-protections-colluding-russia/ 
[https://perma.cc/JE2H-Y9TQ] (suggesting, in discussing the DNC hacking cases, that the Trump 
Campaign would have “undercut” its First Amendment defense if it had “encouraged the Russians to 
hack or steal materials” (emphasis added)). 
394. This refers to coordination with regard to the illegal act itself, not things like plans for 
publication or discussions about what types of information would be most useful or newsworthy.  
395. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 20–22. 
396. See supra text accompanying note 232. 
397. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
398. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 n.5 (2001). 
399. The indictment alleges that Assange advised Manning about the use of a password hash that 
would enable Manning to access databases without her identity being discovered. Assange 
Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 7. It is not clear if Manning successfully used this technique, 
but either way it could demonstrate an attempt by Assange to intervene as a participant in the 
execution of the illegal act and undermine his expected reliance on Bartnicki. 
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participants, either by virtue of their direct engagement in illegal activity 
or their aiding or inducement of that activity. A defendant like the 
National Enquirer, which acquired Jeff Bezos’s private emails to his 
mistress, would not lose protection by paying to acquire information that 
had already been illegally acquired, but it would lose protection if it paid 
the source to acquire the information in the first place. The latter would 
essentially make the source an agent of the Enquirer and make the 
Enquirer effectively a primary participant in the interception. 
Courts should reject Breyer’s suggestion that Bartnicki protection 
might be denied to those who “encouraged,” or 
“participated . . . indirectly” in an illegal interception400 or to those who, 
after the fact, helped transport the information from one node to 
another.401 Courts should accept Breyer’s suggestion, however, that 
protection be denied to those who “ordered”402 illegal activity, but only 
where the requester had some actual power over the source. Similarly, 
courts could embrace Breyer’s suggestion that requesters who 
“counseled”403 their source might lose First Amendment protection, 
provided the counseling involved strategic or technical assistance that 
enabled the illegal act itself. 
C. Narrow Prong Two: No Liability for Possessing Newsworthy 
Information 
The second part of the Bartnicki test—that the defendant acquired the 
information lawfully—was very likely added by Justice Stevens to simply 
acknowledge a question the Court raised but did not answer in Florida 
Star. In that case, the Court held that the First Amendment protected a 
reporter’s publication of non-public information that had been 
accidentally supplied by a government employee.404 The Court declined 
to decide whether the outcome would be different in situations in which 
the law specifically prohibited receipt or possession of the information.405 
In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens noted that Yocum and Vopper had acquired 
 
400. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiori at 
33a, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99–1687)). 
401. This was a particularly odd condition for Breyer to mention because transporting an illegally 
intercepted communication is exactly what Yocum did, yet the Court was clear that Yocum’s actions 
were protected. See id. at 525 n.8 (majority opinion) (“[W]e draw no distinction between the media 
respondents and Yocum.”). 
402. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
403. Id. 
404. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524 (1989). 
405. Id. at 535 n.8. 
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the tape of the intercepted phone conversation lawfully,406 so there was 
once again no reason for the Court to answer the question it reserved in 
Florida Star. Justice Stevens was not necessarily limiting First 
Amendment protection to situations in which defendants’ obtainment or 
possession of information was lawful; he was recognizing that the 
lawfulness of the acquisition by Yocum and Vopper was not in dispute. 
Lower courts have not focused on the impetus for prong two, in part 
because it has not been consequential to the outcome of most cases. For 
those courts that have applied prong two directly, some, like the D.C. 
Circuit in Boehner II, have conflated it with prong one.407 Others, like the 
Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom, have treated the unlawfulness of receiving 
or possessing information as automatically and fully destructive of 
Bartnicki protection, even when the government supplies the information 
and it relates to a matter of public concern.408 This is a punishingly strict 
interpretation that treats surface illegality as decisive, even when it 
implicates First Amendment interests.409 It also creates a loophole for 
legislators to exploit, allowing them to treat newsworthy information as 
contraband and disrupting the balance of interests the Court sought to 
achieve in Bartnicki. In addition, it creates the further danger of punishing 
or chilling ordinary newsgathering functions by forcing requesters of 
information to assume the risk that the information they seek might turn 
out to fall within the parameters of a statutory prohibition and subject 
them to civil or criminal penalties. 
One viable response to all of this would be for courts to simply ignore 
prong two, which, for reasons noted above, they are arguably free to do.410 
A more affirmative and speech-protective approach would be to subject 
to strict scrutiny any government measure authorizing penalties for the 
possession or receipt of newsworthy information. Information should not 
be treated like tangible property, except in very unusual situations,411 and 
never when it involves matters of legitimate public concern. Absent a 
compelling government interest, laws like the Espionage Act and the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act should be struck down to the extent that 
 
406. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525. 
407. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (treating the knowing receipt of illegally 
acquired information as indistinguishable from direct participation in the illegal acquisition). 
408. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 952 (7th Cir. 2015). 
409. Indeed, in Bartnicki, the Court noted that both Vopper and Yocum violated the law by 
disclosing illegally acquired communications, but the Court concluded that it must then consider 
“whether the application of [the wiretap] statutes in such circumstances violates the First 
Amendment.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.  
410. See supra text accompanying notes 404–406; see also supra note 253. 
411. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18. 
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they are designed to, or have the effect of, halting the flow of newsworthy 
information. If laws either explicitly or effectively prohibit the receipt or 
possession of newsworthy information by non-custodians, those 
provisions should be strictly scrutinized and, in most cases, struck down. 
The cases of Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald, who has been 
charged with violating criminal laws in Brazil after accepting hacked 
information, and Julian Assange, who is being prosecuted under the 
Espionage Act, should not hinge on the literal language of criminal 
statutes without regard to the First Amendment interests at stake. 
Applying prong two of Bartnicki too broadly creates an untenable 
situation in which a legislative act can be used to thwart a criminal 
defendant’s ability to even invoke the Bartnicki protection. This puts free 
speech interests in jeopardy and puts statutory law ahead of 
constitutional law. 
There really is only one scenario in which prong two, or something like 
it, might be reasonable: where someone seeks information knowing that 
the receipt or possession of that information is prohibited by law and 
knowing that the information is not of public concern. But courts should 
still distinguish the act of obtainment from the act of publication and apply 
the First Amendment to each independently. There are constitutionally 
permissible ways in which governments can penalize illegal procurement, 
unlawful obtainment, or injurious publication. The principal mistake the 
Supreme Court and many lower courts have made is linking the three 
instead of treating them as discrete acts requiring discrete 
constitutional analyses. 
D. Affirming the Contextual View of Public Concern Under 
Prong Three 
In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer appeared to present two 
different approaches to assessing the extent to which information 
addresses matters of public concern. Stevens focused on the broader 
context or social debate to which the information related, while Breyer 
emphasized the more acute threat posed by Kane’s “porches” comment. 
These are not irreconcilable. One could embrace a contextual approach 
but also acknowledge that a particular fact makes the newsworthiness of 
the publication especially obvious. Justice Breyer could simply have been 
saying that he did not need to examine the broader context of the 
Kane-Bartnicki phone call because the porches comment, by itself, was 
sufficient. Nevertheless, some lower courts have seized on the porches 
comment and Breyer’s concurrence to suggest that anything short of a 
threat of violence will not satisfy prong three. Courts like the Seventh 
Circuit in Dahlstrom, and more recently Judge Hudson’s opinion in 
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Cockrum, treat the porches comment as a minimum threshold, which is 
almost certainly not what Breyer intended. In any case, that interpretation 
makes it far too easy for judges to distinguish Bartnicki and effectively 
limit its protection to extreme cases. Lower courts should reject that 
narrow view (as most have, effectively if not explicitly), which departs 
from the approach courts have traditionally applied in other cases. 
A related issue that courts must resolve is how to assess the 
newsworthiness of publications involving troves of data where the 
material generally addresses matters of public concern but where not 
every component piece of information, in isolation, meets that standard—
or where small bits of private information are embedded in the larger 
collection of newsworthy materials. The competing opinions of Judge 
Koeltl and Judge Hudson in the two DNC hacking cases showcase this 
dilemma, with Judge Hudson suggesting that defendants must 
demonstrate the newsworthiness of all of the revealed parts412 and Judge 
Koeltl holding that prong three should be analyzed by assessing the 
newsworthiness of the whole.413 
Courts should embrace Judge Koeltl’s view for two related reasons. 
The first is that the purpose of the Bartnicki test is not to determine 
whether defendants should be fully immune from liability for harms 
flowing from their publications; it is to determine whether there is a basis 
for linking the defendants to the illegal actions of those who unlawfully 
procured the information. Because the defendant publishers are at least a 
step removed from the first-link actors, and because the purpose of prong 
three is not to balance the various interests but simply to determine if there 
is at least some public value served by publication, it makes sense for 
courts to apply an expansive concept of public interest in that context. 
A second reason for embracing a broad definition of public concern is 
that there are almost always post-publication remedies available to 
plaintiffs if the published information causes some demonstrable harm. In 
hacking cases like those involving the DNC, Bartnicki would lose all of 
its force if defendants were required to demonstrate the newsworthiness 
of every published fragment of information. At the same time, there are 
real risks that private information will sometimes be swept up and 
exposed as part of large-scale disclosures. The best accommodation is to 
take a broad view of public concern under prong three but recognize that 
publishers receive no special protection from post-publication lawsuits 
targeting the content of their disclosures. Publishers would therefore still 
have an incentive to search for and filter out private information, but the 
 
412. See supra text accompanying note 349. 
413. See supra text accompanying note 350.  
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burden of proof would remain with the plaintiffs to demonstrate, in 
separate a lawsuit, the specific ways in which the published information 
has caused them harm. 
There are a couple of additional issues under prong three that warrant 
some attention but that are less critical. One is the lingering confusion 
about terminology. Chief Justice Rehnquist was not entirely wrong to 
point out in his dissent that “public concern” is “an amorphous 
concept.”414 But the Court added some clarity in two post-Bartnicki 
rulings—Roe and Snyder415—and for decades the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have applied parallel concepts like public issue, public 
interest, and newsworthiness, so the Bartnicki Court’s use of public 
concern was appropriate for the kind of macro-level test it was 
articulating. Still, it would be ideal if the Court simply declared that the 
variations among these terms are not legally consequential in this context. 
Finally, there is the issue of the journalistic standing of defendants and 
whether their credentials, institutional affiliations, or the media through 
which they communicate are relevant in assessing either their general 
eligibility for Bartnicki protection or their more specific ability to 
demonstrate the newsworthiness of their disclosures. The indictment of 
Julian Assange seems carefully framed to downplay the journalistic 
legitimacy of Wikileaks and to present Assange as a simple vandal. The 
indictment does not mention the First Amendment, much less Bartnicki. 
But any attempt to deny Assange’s ability to invoke Bartnicki finds no 
support from the Bartnicki justices, who made clear that they drew “no 
distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.”416 There is also 
remarkably little support for this view in the two decades of decisions 
applying Bartnicki. Aside from one state district court that made the 
anomalous and conceptually indefensible417 claim that defendants might 
have less Bartnicki protection when they publish via commercial media,418 
the other courts have been remarkably consistent in focusing solely on the 
social value of the information published rather than the characteristics or 
motives of the publisher. This is one area where the courts have moved 
toward a more contemporary and egalitarian conception of press freedom. 
 
414. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
415. See supra text accompanying notes 300–303. 
416. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 n.8. 
417. Excluding protection for defendants who profit from their publications would necessarily 
exclude most news organizations, most of which distribute content through purchased media products 
that are sustained through advertising and subscription fees.  
418. See Bowens v. Ary, Inc., No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *21 (Sept. 24, 2009), 
rev’d in part, 489 Mich. 851 (Mich. 2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has always 
emphasized the free flow of information from “diverse and 
antagonistic”419 sources of information and the need for “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide open”420 debate on public issues. Those objectives can 
be powerfully served by modern communication technology and citizen 
communicators, but only if those people and tools are not unduly 
constrained by law. Bartnicki was an important decision, rendered at the 
dawn of the Internet age, that extended the principles of Pentagon Papers 
outside of the prior restraint circumstance and affirmed the constitutional 
bias in favor of the largely unfettered circulation of newsworthy 
information—whatever its provenance—by law-abiding communicators. 
Bartnicki’s effect on contemporary communication, however, is less 
clear. Lower courts applying the decision have reached disparate 
conclusions and collectively have done more to obfuscate than illuminate 
the parameters of the Bartnicki framework. Many of those courts have 
also sapped Bartnicki of its force by narrowly reading Stevens’s opinion 
or giving almost superseding weight to Breyer’s concurrence. 
This ambiguity is enormously consequential in light of the ways in 
which communication is now accessed and shared, and in light of the new 
wave of cases arriving in U.S. courts. When and if Assange is prosecuted, 
his case will occur in a legal domain that, two decades after Bartnicki and 
a half-century after Pentagon Papers, still has few clear lines of 
demarcation. This uncertainty was exposed and exacerbated by some of 
the first post-Bartnicki circuit rulings,421 and it is apparent in the most 
recent district court cases as well.422 
Bartnicki was a necessary decision but a needlessly complicated one. 
The Court could have leaned on earlier precedent—both its own decisions 
in cases like Daily Mail and influential circuit decisions like Food Lion—
to recognize the separateness of procurement and publication and to treat 
them as discrete acts subject to discrete remedies and constitutional 
analyses. That remains the best path forward: untethering people’s First 
Amendment right to publish from their actions, and the actions of their 
sources, in acquiring information. Short of that, there is substantial work 
ahead for the courts in clarifying the elements of the Bartnicki framework. 
 
419. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
420. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
421. Compare Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003), with Jean v. Mass. State 
Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007). 
422. Compare Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 
2019), with Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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With regard to prong one, courts should only deny Bartnicki protection 
to those who were primary participants in illegally procuring information, 
those who aided and abetted a primary participant by providing significant 
before-the-fact assistance, or those who intentionally sought out private 
information that they knew was illegal to disclose and was not of public 
concern. Courts should effectively eliminate prong two by rejecting the 
treatment of information as property and closing the loophole exposed by 
the Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom that authorizes liability for the mere 
receipt or possession of newsworthy information. This could be used as a 
back door to criminalize leaks—for both government-leakers and 
journalist-leakees.423 Finally, with regard to prong three, courts should 
embrace Justice Stevens’s contextual view of public concern and, with 
large batches of information, focus on the newsworthiness of the whole 
while still preserving remedies for plaintiffs who are individually harmed 
by the publication of their private information. 
These and other changes described in this Article will help bring clarity 
to the law while strengthening the rights of journalists and citizens to 
circulate information about public issues and hold accountable 
government and other powerful interests. This would also serve as a small 
but useful step in halting the broader drift toward authoritarian 
government, institutional opacity, and concentrated private-sector power. 
 
 
423. Relatedly, courts should reject the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of records requesters as primary 
participants when information is supplied to them by government agencies and other third parties. See 
supra section III.B. 
